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Abstract
Today’s vehicle manufacturers do not tend to publish proprietary packet formats for
the controller area network (CAN), a network protocol regularly used in automobiles
and manufacturing. This is a form of security through obscurity—it makes reverse
engineering efforts more difficult for would-be intruders—but obfuscating the CAN
data in this way does not adequately hide the vehicle’s unique signature, even if these
data are unprocessed or limited in scope. To prove this, we train two distinct deep
learning models on data from 11 different vehicles. Our results clearly indicate that
one can determine which vehicle generated a given sample of CAN data. This erodes
consumer safety: a sophisticated attacker who establishes a presence on an unknown
vehicle can use similar techniques to identify the vehicle and better format attacks.
To protect critical cyber-physical systems (CPSs) against attacks like those enabled
by this CAN vulnerability, system administrators often develop and employ intrusion
detection systems (IDSs). Before developing an IDS, one requires an understanding
of the behavior of the CPS and of the causality of its constituent parts. Such an
understanding allows one to characterize normal behavior and, in turn, identify and
report anomalous behavior. This research explores two different time series analysis
techniques, Granger causality and empirical dynamic modeling (EDM), which may
contribute to this understanding of a system. Our findings indicate that Granger
causality is not a suitable approach to IDS development but that EDM may enable the
understanding of a system required of an IDS architect. We thus encourage further
research into EDM applications to IDSs for CPSs.
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CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM INTRUSION:
A CASE STUDY OF AUTOMOBILE IDENTIFICATION VULNERABILITIES
AND AUTOMATED APPROACHES FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The controller area network (CAN), a cyber-physical system (CPS) that connects
a large number of the devices in a modern vehicle (including vital systems like the
brakes, steering wheel, and transmission), is vulnerable in several ways. In the extreme,
it is vulnerable to cyberattacks capable of altering, preventing, or otherwise modifying
the operator’s desired behavior. This research presents a more obscure vulnerability:
the packets that broadcast on a vehicle’s CAN bus can uniquely identify the vehicle.
This means that an attacker can construct a database of known CAN packet formats
and, using this database and one of the tools presented in Chapter III, identify a new
vehicle. This allows the attacker to strengthen the attack and thus places the operator
and passengers at greater risk.
We illustrate this vulnerability by building, tuning, and evaluating two deep
learning models. We train the models by giving as input CAN data samples and each
sample’s generating vehicle, and we test these models by giving new samples as input
and comparing the predicted vehicle to the actual vehicle. This research seeks to
determine which vehicle generated each test sample. Data comes from one primary
source and consists of 230 megabytes of raw CAN data captured from 11 distinct
vehicles. By formatting and partitioning the available data, we generate two disparate
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datasets. The first is composed of all available 1,024-byte CAN samples; the second
contains samples from the first such that the classes are evenly represented. Each
sample’s label is the ID of the vehicle that generated it.
We then feed these samples into the deep learning models. The first, a multilayer
perceptron (MLP), is simple enough that an attacker only somewhat familiar with
deep learning tools can easily implement it and use it to classify CAN samples with
some level of success. The second, a more complex convolutional neural network
(CNN), achieves much better classification performance than does the MLP. Overall,
results indicate that one can use either the MLP or the CNN to determine which
vehicle generated a given CAN data sample. This compromises operator and passenger
privacy. It also risks safety because it gives bad cyber actors another tool to correctly
structure malicious CAN packets.
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are a common method to defend against CPS
attacks, including those enabled by the aforementioned CAN vulnerability. These
systems monitor computer networks such as CAN and report malicious activity to
system administrators. In the CPS domain, an IDS can detect attackers attempting
to modify or misrepresent physical processes. Consider an automobile’s CPSs. If
an attacker intends to, say, cause the driver to speed and thus receive a speeding
ticket, the attacker may choose to inject packets detailing a lower speed, which would
in turn cause the speedometer to display incorrect information. In this case, an
effective IDS will notice that the data for speed does not conform to the expected
behavior indicated by the data for the related physical processes (e.g., engine and
wheel rotational velocities, throttle position, fuel efficiency). In other words, the IDS
will notice that the speed readings are anomalous. As another example, if an IDS
knows that a substantial increase in an automobile’s brake pressure likely precedes a
relative decrease in velocity, the IDS can assert that no change, a small change, or
2
an increase in velocity (after significant brake pressure) is anomalous. Of course, this
requires an IDS capable of determining expected behavior and identifying anomalies.
To design such an IDS for a vulnerable CPS, IDS architects require the following:
1. Insight into the dynamics or patterns of a CPS, to include an understanding
of the way in which some current system state or behavior enables predictions
concerning a future state;
2. An ample quantity of data obtained under normal operating conditions to
establish normal behavior;
3. A process to determine whether new traffic conforms to normal behavior; and
4. An alert system to report to the administrator the traffic that does not conform.
IDS architects can achieve (1) by obtaining either significant understanding of a
CPS or sufficiently powerful computational resources. Often, the latter is infeasible:
many CPSs are computationally limited by available hardware or by standards and
regulations. Modern automobiles, for example, utilize small packets and fairly simple
hardware. For this reason, the former is often more attainable. A solid understanding
of a system’s dynamics, like how one signal affects another or how some current state
predicts some future state—causality, in a word—allows an architect to develop a
mechanism to identify anomalous traffic.1 This research thus examines two different
techniques to contribute to an architect’s understanding of a system. The first, Granger
causality, is a well-known, simple method for evaluating the causality between two time
series. The second, empirical dynamic modeling (EDM), is an emerging field capable
of more sophisticated time series analysis. Our research attempts to demonstrate a
potential ability to use one or both techniques as the first step towards an IDS.
1Assuming the architect has an ample quantity of normal data.
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To do so, we apply Granger causality and EDM to two distinct datasets. We
generate the first dataset using a simplistic model of the relationship between an
automobile’s steering wheel and the relative velocity of its two front wheels. Addition-
ally, the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) maintains a flight simulator, the Avionics
Vulnerability Assessment System (AVAS), which generates the second dataset used in
this research. The simulation computes various metrics, like airspeed, angle of attack,
position, heading, and wind angle; this research concerns the airplane’s airspeed,
altitude, and pitch. The simulator logs all values as they change over time. The
steering and AVAS datasets represent a linear system and a nonlinear one, respectively.
To evaluate the available analysis tools, we compute Granger causality for every
pair of variables in both systems. In doing so, we determine if the simple technique
affords insights sophisticated enough to develop an effective IDS. We then apply every
EDM tool to the two datasets to establish whether or not its more complex analysis
better enables an IDS than does that of Granger causality. The results support Clive
Granger’s original claim: Granger causality tests do not apply to nonlinear systems
in a meaningful way [1]. The results further indicate that, even for linear systems, a
Granger causality analysis is likely insufficient for IDS design. However, the results of
the EDM analyses imply a possibility of using the technique to develop sophisticated
IDSs for nonlinear systems. For linear systems, EDM does not appear to reveal
any previously unknown, important dynamics (including those identified by Granger
causality or by other analysis techniques).
1.2 Contributions
The primary contributions of this research are as follows:
• A previously unseen demonstration of the unique signature of a vehicle’s raw
CAN data and a discussion of the associated risks;
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• An in-depth presentation of the advantages and disadvantages of Granger causal-
ity and EDM, as applied to both linear and nonlinear data;
• The first known argument for applying EDM to cybersecurity and, more specifi-
cally, to IDS development; and
• A complete library of available EDM functions for use with any set of time series
data of a specific format.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this thesis reviews the research in detail. Chapter II presents
necessary background information before discussing some of the related work in
current literature and explaining why this work is insufficient for the research at
hand. Chapter III describes the CAN fingerprinting experiments, including the data
used, the deep learning methodology, and the results obtained. Chapter IV examines
whether Granger causality or EDM could serve as the first step toward an effective
IDS. Specifically, the chapter details the data, the analysis techniques, and the results
of the analyses. Finally, Chapter V considers the implications of the results found in
Chapters III and IV and suggests possible opportunities for future research.
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II. Background and Related Work
Each section in this chapter focuses on a specific field of research or technology.
The chapter first defines cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and time series data before
introducing the controller area network (CAN) protocol and its use in the automotive
industry. Next, it details the need for intrusion detection systems (IDSs) in critical
systems, including those vehicles that utilize the CAN protocol. It follows by describing
causality and explaining Granger causality and empirical dynamic modeling (EDM),
two different techniques for causality analysis. The chapter then discusses neural
networks and deep learning approaches to classification. Finally, it examines some of
the current literature in these fields and highlights relevant gaps in recent research.
2.1 Cyber-Physical Systems & Time Series Data
The Association for Computing Machinery Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
defines CPSs as follows:
“Cyber-Physical Systems ... has emerged as a unifying name for systems
where the cyber parts, i.e., the computing and communication parts, and
the physical parts are tightly integrated, both at the design time and
during operation. Such systems use computations and communication
deeply embedded in and interacting with physical processes to add new
capabilities to physical systems ... There is an emerging consensus that new
methodologies and tools need to be developed to support cyber-physical
systems.” [2]
A CPS can be represented by a model, but this model is typically difficult to
understand or replicate.2 For this reason, one must analyze the CPS’s output. Often,
the output of CPS monitoring is time series data representing the value of some process
(or processes) over time. One example of a time series in an aircraft is the propeller’s
2Granger causality and EDM attempt to give insight into a CPS’s model.
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instantaneous revolutions per minute (RPM) over time, as measured by the aircraft’s
sensors. The National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) says the following of
time series analysis: “Time series analysis accounts for the fact that data points taken
over time may have an internal structure (such as autocorrelation, trend or seasonal
variation) that should be accounted for” [3]. Kotu and Deshpande contrast time series
analysis and forecasting: “Time series analysis is the process of extracting meaningful
non-trivial information and patterns from time series. Time series forecasting is the
process of predicting the future value of time series data based on past observations
and other inputs” [4]. Most techniques for both analysis and forecasting require data
stationarity for the time series in question. Says NIST: “A stationary process has the
property that the mean, variance and autocorrelation structure do not change over
time ... a flat looking series, without trend, constant variance over time, a constant
autocorrelation structure over time and no periodic fluctuations (seasonality)” [3].
Figure 1 presents examples of time series plots; panels (b) and (g) represent
stationary time series. Although these are arbitrary plots, they succinctly represent
a wide array of potential time series. Many of the time series generated by the
CPSs in an automobile or aircraft are non-stationary, so analysis and forecasting
techniques that require stationarity (e.g., Granger causality) are likely not viable for
these data. Other techniques, like EDM, allow for non-stationary time series analysis
and forecasting. Section 2.4 explores causality analysis using two different techniques.
2.2 The Controller Area Network Protocol
The CAN protocol is a link-layer message broadcast system developed for auto-
mobile applications by Bosch in the early 1980s [6, 7]. It is commonly used in the
automotive, manufacturing, and healthcare industries due to its low cost, low weight,
and architectural simplicity. As Figure 2 shows for a set of four devices controlled by
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Figure 1. Examples of time series plots. “(a) Google stock price for 200 consecutive
days; (b) Daily change in the Google stock price for 200 consecutive days; (c) Annual
number of [labor] strikes in the US; (d) Monthly sales of new one-family houses sold
in the US; (e) Annual price of a dozen eggs in the US (constant dollars); (f ) Monthly
total of pigs slaughtered in Victoria, Australia; (g) Annual total of lynx trapped in the
McKenzie River district of north-west Canada; (h) Monthly Australian beer produc-
tion; (i) Monthly Australian electricity production.” [5]
an electronic control unit (ECU), the network significantly reduces required wiring
within CPSs. Systems that implement the CAN protocol typically use one or more
packet frame formats. Figures 3 to 5 display the standard format, the extended
format, and the flexible data rate (CAN FD) format, respectively. These formats are
backwards compatible. The extended format enables longer message IDs than does
the standard format. The CAN FD format enables larger payload sizes and a potential
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transmission rate increase [8, 9]. For all three formats, only the arbitration ID (ArbID)
and payload are variable; the remaining fields—flags and error-checking bits—are set
deterministically according to the ArbID and payload. An implementation of the
CAN protocol, which links sensing and actuating devices to a computer network, is a
classic example of a CPS.
Point-to-Point Wiring Networked Wiring
ECUECU
Figure 2. Vehicle network wiring before and after the CAN protocol. [10]
In automobiles, the devices on the network broadcast short messages detailing the
vehicle’s functionality (e.g., wheel speed, brake pedal pressure, engine RPM); this
ensures data consistency throughout the vehicle. United States federal regulations
require that all passenger vehicles manufactured after 2007 provide an on-board
diagnostics (OBD)-II interface connected to the CAN bus. Consumers, mechanics,
and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) can utilize this interface to monitor
some of the car’s communications [11]. Recent CAN data collection efforts found
that most vehicles utilize the standard or extended frame formats specified in ISO
11898-1:2015, so CAN frames in today’s automobiles typically contain no more than
eight data bytes [12]. This limits the complexity of CAN data analysis.
The components along the CAN bus are cost-sensitive, so on-bus computational
capabilities are limited. For these reasons, automobile manufacturers typically employ
a policy of security through obscurity, in which the exact data contents are obfuscated
9
Figure 3. ISO 11898-1 CAN standard message format. [11]
Figure 4. ISO 11898-1 CAN extended message format. [11]
Figure 5. ISO 11898-1 CAN flexible data rate message format. [8]
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to prevent significant analysis of proprietary CAN designs. For this reason, it is
difficult for a non-insider to learn what information is contained in a vehicle’s CAN
data [13]. However, Stone et al. showed that CAN data collected via an OBD-II port
can be automatically reverse-engineered, processed, and converted into time series
data. Additionally, the researchers hypothesized that one can quantify the causal
relationships present in these time series with EDM [12].
2.3 Intrusion Detection Systems
Much like a home security system which alerts the police in the event of a burglary,
an IDS monitors a computer network and alerts the system administrator in the event
of an intrusion. Accomplished cybersecurity researcher Dorothy Denning said the
following of IDSs:
“The development of a real-time intrusion-detection system is motivated
by four factors: 1) most existing systems have security flaws that render
them susceptible to intrusions, penetrations, and other forms of abuse;
finding and fixing all these deficiencies is not feasible for technical and
economic reasons; 2) existing systems with known flaws are not easily
replaced by systems that are more secure—mainly because the systems
have attractive features that are missing in the more-secure systems, or
else they cannot be replaced for economic reasons; 3) developing systems
that are absolutely secure is extremely difficult, if not generally impossible;
and 4) even the most secure systems are vulnerable to abuses by insiders
who misuse their privileges.” [14]
As the availability of cyber devices has increased over the past three decades, so
too has the need for effective IDSs. There are two primary types of IDS: misuse
detection and anomaly detection [15]. Misuse detection systems compare network
traffic to predefined attack signatures stored in large databases; a match indicates
an attack on the network. Anomaly detection systems, on the other hand, compare
traffic to a predetermined baseline to identify anomalies. Detecting and preventing
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intrusions on a vehicle’s CAN bus limits the possibility of attacks like the 2015 Jeep
hack [16, 17]. Such an attack is made possible by the CAN’s prime vulnerabilities:
“1) weak access control; 2) no encryption; 3) and no authentication” [18]. Tyree et al.
discuss three IDS approaches specific to the CAN domain [19]:
1. Rule-based IDSs: “Early works involve rule-based detectors, an analogue of
signature-based detection in enterprise security. These can detect simple signal-
injection attacks, (sophisticated but very limited) bus-off attacks ... and poten-
tially ECU reprogramming.”
2. Frequency-based IDSs: These systems aim “to exploit the regular frequency of
important CAN messages. Frequency anomalies have been explored to detect
and prevent signal-injection attacks and potentially ECU reprogramming.”
3. ECU-fingerprinting IDSs: Such detectors consider “automatic ECU identification
as a stepping stone to IDS . . . [by using] data-driven techniques to classify which
ECU sent each message by exploiting timing or voltage signatures.”
Recently, various approaches in deep learning have allowed for the development
of effective IDSs in all three categories. Kang and Kang present one such example
[20]. See Liao et al. and Kwon et al. for discussions on further examples [21, 22]. In
general, these examples only develop IDSs for standard computer networks instead of
for CPSs. This is a limitation of these research efforts.
2.4 Causality & Time Series Analysis
Causality is the relationship between cause and effect. For two processes a and b
that exhibit a highly causal relationship, one can expect that some set of parameters
for a predicts some other set of parameters for b. If a and b are not causal, modifying
a is not likely to elicit a predictable response in b. In passenger vehicles, causality
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is ever-present. The engine’s RPM, for example, directly affects the vehicle’s speed.
Brake position indirectly affects engine RPM and thus the vehicle’s speed. Causal
relationships also hold in the reverse direction. Some perceived value for vehicle speed
implies that the vehicle must have had an engine RPM in some identifiable range at
some previous point in time. Pearl, one of the preeminent researchers in the field, says
the following of causality:
“We say, for example, ‘reckless driving causes accidents’ or ‘you will fail
the course because of your laziness’ (Suppes 1970), knowing quite well that
the antecedents merely tend to make the consequences more likely, not
absolutely certain. Any theory of causality that aims at accommodating
such utterances must therefore be cast in a language that distinguishes
various shades of likelihood—namely, the language of probabilities. Con-
nected with this observation, we note that probability theory is currently
the official mathematical language of most disciplines that use causal mod-
eling, . . . In these disciplines, investigators are concerned not merely with
the presence or absence of causal connections but also with the relative
strengths of those connections and with ways of inferring those connections
from noisy observations. Probability theory . . . provides both the princi-
ples and the means of coping with—and drawing inferences from—such
observations.” [23]
In fewer words, Pearl asserts that causality is difficult to measure. Researchers who
seek to analyze causality in a system must approximate it using methods in statistical
probability. Granger causality presents one such method. EDM provides several
statistical analysis techniques, and some of these techniques also seek to estimate the
causality in a system. Understanding this causality could enable an effective IDS.
2.4.1 Granger Causality
Pearl further claims that Granger causality is a “statistical rather than causal
[method]” meaning that it does not directly quantify causality [23]. Still, Granger’s
technique is likely the most prominent and widely used method for approximating
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causality in a system, probably because it “does not rely on the specification of a
scientific model and thus is particularly suited for empirical investigations of cause-
effect relationships” [24]. If the following properties hold for the variables X and Y ,
then X is said to Granger-cause Y [1]:
1. “The effect [Y ] does not precede its cause [X] in time” [24].
2. “The causal series [X] contains unique information about the series being caused
[Y ] that is not available otherwise” [24].
It is difficult to deterministically confirm (2). For this reason, one mathematically
identifies Granger causality by predicting Y ; if the variance of the prediction error is
lower when X is included in the prediction set than when it is not, then X Granger-
causes Y [1]. Note that the accuracy of the causality estimation is improved if both X
and Y are stationary. Granger causality does have one other major caveat: because
it essentially measures association between two variables, it can lead to illegitimate
causalities if one does not consider important relevant variables [24]. Overall, though,
this concept serves as a key tool for time series analysis, and this research shows that
it allows one to draw limited conclusions about time series data generated by some
CPSs. Figure 6 presents an example of a time series X that Granger-causes another
time series Y .
Concerning applications of time series analysis to IDSs, Qin and Lee explored a
tangential application of Granger causality to cybersecurity efforts. Specifically, the
authors used Granger causality to correlate and aggregate security alerts to identify
high-priority alerts [26]. Cabrera et al. (2001) applied Granger causality to the traffic
preceding a network attack to determine which variables best predict the attack. They
then showed that observation of these important variables can assist in determining
signatures of network attacks [27]. Finally, Cabrera et al. (2002) conducted limited,
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Figure 6. Visualization of Granger causality. Here, X Granger-causes Y . [25]
controlled experiments in a very similar domain. Their work uses Granger causality
to discover relevant variables prior to distributed denial of service attacks [28].
2.4.2 Empirical Dynamic Modeling
Floris Takens introduced the delay embedding theorem in 1981 [29]. Takens’s
Theorem concerns mathematical attractors, where “an attractor is the value, or set of
values, that a system settles toward over time” [30]. EDM is an application of Takens’s
Theorem. In Sugihara et al.’s words, the field “is based on the mathematical theory
of reconstructing system attractors from time series data” [31]. Most applications
of the techniques concern economics or natural sciences; for example, the Sugihara
Laboratory, from which EDM originated, primarily applies the techniques to ecology.
In practice, EDM allows one to model nonlinear dynamic systems with observational
time series data. Figure 7 provides a summarized visual explanation of the main ideas
in Takens’s Theorem and in EDM. Specifically, panel (A) depicts a Lorenz attractor3
as a model of a dynamic system. As the image shows, one can identify a time series
for a given dimension by recording that dimension’s observations over time. Panel
3The Lorenz attractor is a set of solutions to the Lorenz system, a system of ordinary differential
equations first studied by Edward Lorenz in 1963 [32].
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(B) shows that a univariate time series can be converted to a higher dimensional
representation by using time-lagged versions of itself as additional dimensions. EDM
calls the resulting manifold a shadow manifold. Takens showed that the shadow
manifold is diffeomorphic (maps one-to-one) to its original attractor manifold M [29].
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Figure 7. “Empirical dynamic modeling: (A) Example Lorenz system. The attractor
manifold M is the set of states that the system progresses through time. Projection of
the system state from M to the coordinate axis X generates a time series. (B) Lags of
the time series X are used as coordinate axes to construct the shadow manifold MX ,
which is diffeomorphic (maps 1:1) to the original manifold M . The visual similarity
between MX and M is apparent.” [31, 33]
Sugihara et al. demonstrated that this diffeomorphic property between M and
its shadow manifolds—one for each dimension—implies that the shadow manifolds
are diffeomorphic with respect to each other. The opposite is also true. Thus, if two
shadow manifolds are shown to be diffeomorphic with respect to each other, one can
assume they belong to the same dynamic system. One can then use convergent cross
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mapping (CCM), a mathematical technique recently developed by Sugihara et al., to
identify the presence of and quantify the causality between the two original time series
[34]. In short, CCM seeks to determine whether an arbitrary point and its nearest
neighbors in one shadow manifold can accurately predict a point and its neighbors in
another shadow manifold. Figure 8 summarizes this concept. Sugihara et al. showed
that increasing the sample sizes for the shadow manifolds improves CCM’s predictive
power, but they also showed that this predictive power converges to some maximum
as the sample sizes increase to infinity [29, 34].
(xt, xt-τ, xt-2τ)
(yt, yt-τ, yt-2τ)
(xt, yt, zt)
M
MyMx
Figure 8. “Convergent cross mapping (CCM) tests for correspondence between shadow
manifolds. This example based on the canonical Lorenz system (a coupled system in
X, Y , and Z ...) shows the attractor manifold for the original system (M) and two
shadow manifolds, MX and MY , constructed using lagged-coordinate embeddings of X
and Y , respectively (lag = τ). Because X and Y are dynamically coupled, points that
are nearby on MX ... will correspond temporally to points that are nearby on MY
... This enables us to estimate states across manifolds using Y to estimate the state
of X and vice versa using nearest neighbors ... With longer time series, the shadow
manifolds become denser and the neighborhoods (ellipses of nearest neighbors) shrink,
allowing more precise cross-map estimates” [33, 34]. The arrows between the manifolds
represent the diffeomorphic properties of the attractors.
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2.4.3 Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
There exists another, much more well-known method for forecasting time series:
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models. Implementations of
ARIMA first difference a time series to ensure data stationarity before regressing
past values, or lags, of the time series against the original to make predictions. The
method uses a moving window approach, which means it computes forecast error using
the errors for past slices of the time series [4, 35]. Some researchers have published
promising work in ARIMA applications to cybersecurity. Yaacob et al., for example,
obtained notable IDS results for a specific attack with a set of test data, but the
researchers imply a high likelihood of false alarms and thus recommend more research
efforts [36]. Similarly, Shirani, Azgomi, and Alrabaee compute confidence intervals for
future network traffic using ARIMA. Although the proposed methodology can identify
attacks with specific data patterns, their research indicates that ARIMA cannot enable
a general-purpose IDS for CPSs [15]. Specifically, because ARIMA forecasts a time
series using only the data from that series, it is not likely to contribute significantly to
the deep understanding of a system’s dynamics required by an IDS. For this reason,
we consider techniques—like EDM—that afford IDS architects a deeper understanding
of a system.
2.5 Deep Learning
Deep learning, a subfield of machine learning, is motivated by the desire to solve
problems that standard computing approaches either fail to solve or solve suboptimally.
Although the field has a long history of developments, much of its notable success is
recent. As pioneering scientist Terrence Sejnowski claims, “What made it possible for
deep learning to make big breakthroughs on some of the most difficult problems in
artificial intelligence was persistence, big data, and a lot more computer power” [37].
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Until the 2000s, researchers simply lacked the hardware, software, and data necessary
for effective applications of deep learning techniques. Recently, such techniques
have achieved success and garnered attention in the fields of computer vision, audio
processing, game-playing, and time series analysis (among others). In the context of
this research, deep neural networks enable pattern detection in CAN data, both for
classification and prediction purposes.
2.5.1 Neural Networks
The fundamental deep learning tool is the feedforward neural network or multilayer
perceptron (MLP). Effectively, an MLP aims to loosely model the human brain by
using a set of neurons or nodes. In practice, researchers use MLPs to approximate a
function f ∗; the network “defines a mapping y = f(x; θ) and learns the value of the
parameters θ that result in the best function approximation” [38]. Such a network is
called “feedforward” because information flows strictly from the input layer, through
the computations that define f , and to the output layer.4 The interior layers in a
neural network (if such layers exist) are called hidden layers because the outputs of
these layers are not freely inspectable. A neural network is a deep neural network if it
contains at least two hidden layers.5 One can often use an MLP to approximate a
nonlinear function using few hidden layers [40]. Figure 9 presents such an MLP; this
one is capable of emulating the exclusive or operation.
In deep learning, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) “are a specialized kind of
neural network for processing data that has a known grid-like topology”; because time
series are effectively one-dimensional grids, these networks are well-suited for time
series data [35, 38]. Where standard neural networks use general matrix multiplication
operations to approximate f ∗, CNNs utilize convolution, a special mathematical
4Neural networks that use feedback connections, where information flows back to previous layers,
are called recurrent neural networks.
5Definitions for deep networks differ. Two or more hidden layers is a common definition [39].
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Figure 9. “An example of a feedforward network, drawn in two different styles ... It has
a single hidden layer containing two units. (Left) In this style, we draw every unit as a
node in the graph. This style is explicit and unambiguous, but for networks larger than
this example, it can consume too much space. (Right) In this style, we draw a node in
the graph for each entire vector representing a layer’s activations. This style is much
more compact. Sometimes we annotate the edges in this graph with the name of the
parameters that describe the relationship between two layers. Here, we indicate that
a matrix W describes the mapping from x to h, and a vector w describes the mapping
from h to y. We typically omit the intercept parameters associated with each layer
when labeling this kind of drawing.” [38]
operation in which a user-defined kernel convolves with an input to generate an output.
The kernel, input, and output are represented by multidimensional arrays.6 Figure 10
depicts a simple convolution operation.
2.5.2 Classification
Classification, one of the primary applications of deep learning, is the task of
predicting an input’s class (or category). Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville summarize
classification in the following way:
“In this type of task, the computer program is asked to specify which of k
categories some input belongs to. To solve this task, the learning algorithm
is usually asked to produce a function f : Rn → {1, ..., k}. When y = f(x),
the model assigns an input described by vector x to a category identified
by numeric code y. There are other variants of the classification task, for
example, where f outputs a probability distribution over classes.” [38]
6In the context of time series or CAN data, each array is of shape n× 1.
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Figure 10. “An example of 2-D convolution without kernel flipping. We restrict the
output to only positions where the kernel lies entirely within the image, called ‘valid’
convolution in some contexts. We draw boxes with arrows to indicate how the upper-
left element of the output tensor is formed by applying the kernel to the corresponding
upper-left region of the input tensor.” [38]
2.5.3 Siamese Neural Networks
Siamese neural networks (SNNs) are a different type of neural network to determine
whether two inputs represent the same entity or different entities. An SNN can be
implemented as any type of network, including MLPs and CNNs. One may imagine
an SNN as consisting of two networks in tandem, where the networks have identical
architectures and use identical weights. The SNN receives two matrices as input,
encodes each as a feature vector, and compares the two vectors [41].7 To determine
7In practice, one implements a single network to reduce space requirements; the network receives
and encodes each half of the input pair before comparing the encoded vectors [40].
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whether two inputs represent the same entity, the SNN uses one of two primary loss
functions: (1) contrastive loss and (2) triplet loss. The former computes the absolute
difference between the vectors and reports same if the difference surpasses some
threshold and not same otherwise. The latter requires a third input—an anchor—and
updates the network’s weights such that the anchor input and the same input encode
to similar vectors, while the anchor input and the not same input encode to dissimilar
vectors [40, 41].
This functionality may enable a more robust vehicle classifier. An attacker with
a well-trained SNN need not collect data from every possible vehicle. Instead, the
attacker only needs enough data to train the SNN to determine whether the same
vehicle generated two different samples of CAN data. At that point, the attacker
can effectively classify any new vehicle by comparing its data samples to those of the
previously seen vehicles.
2.6 Predictive Approaches for the CAN
Most researchers concerned with CAN security attempt to predict future values in
a time series. For example, Marchetti et al. devise an IDS by analyzing sequential
CAN IDs, and Tyree et al. create an IDS that learns relationships in different time
series signals [19, 42]. However, some researchers in recent years have used deep
learning to classify CAN data. Kang and Kang train a deep neural network to classify
CAN data packets as either normal or abnormal [20]. Kwon et al.’s literature survey
details more examples of deep learning as applied to IDSs and to CAN security [22].
Recent research also shows that one can certainly distinguish CAN data. Enev et al.
show that machine learning can discriminate between different drivers using just the
reverse-engineered CAN data collected from the vehicle [43]. However, their research
does not claim to distinguish the raw CAN data generated by different vehicles.
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2.7 Summary of Related Work
In summary, previous research efforts into the CAN protocol have demonstrated the
ability to (a) predict CAN data (but not classify it); (b) classify CAN signals as good or
bad; or (c) classify vehicles by analyzing reverse-engineered CAN data. None of these
efforts depict an ability to classify vehicles using raw CAN data. This is an important
gap in current research, and our thesis seeks to address this gap. Concerning IDSs,
our work differs from previous work in that it compares EDM to Granger causality as
a time series analysis technique for IDS development. Additionally, past research does
not examine Granger causality applications to general-purpose IDSs; in each case,
the researchers attempt to predict very specific attacks. Finally, our investigation of
the current literature revealed no research into EDM applications to automobile- or
aircraft-generated time series or to cybersecurity as a whole. We foresee EDM as a
useful contribution to the cybersecurity domain, and our research thus seeks to link
the two in a way not yet found in the literature.
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III. Fingerprinting Vehicles with CAN Bus Data Samples
This chapter addresses the controller area network (CAN) vulnerability mentioned
in Chapter I. Specifically, this chapter shows definitively that an original equipment
manufacturer (OEM)’s obfuscation processes do not mask a vehicle’s identity because
CAN data from one vehicle is uniquely identifiable. Two deep learning models, one a
multilayer perceptron (MLP) and the other a convolutional neural network (CNN),
are trained for each of three distinct data formatting processes to determine how well
a model can distinguish between CAN data from disparate vehicles. Input to the
models consists of the formatted CAN data; each model then predicts the vehicle ID
and compares its output to the true vehicle ID. As the results of the experiments
indicate, CAN data can be uniquely attributed to its generating vehicle regardless of
the data formatting process. The remainder of this chapter discusses the nature and
origins of the data. It then discusses each of the experiments in turn, to include the
data formatting process, the deep learning models employed, and the results.
3.1 Data
This research uses 230 megabytes of Stone et al.’s CAN data [12]. The researchers
conducted one capture on each of 11 different vehicles. Table 1 displays metadata for
the vehicles in the dataset.
A large comma-separated values (CSV) file stores the data. Each of the 4,161,755
rows in this file represents one CAN message, and each row contains:
• A capture id and a vehicle id, which identify the message’s origin;
• A timestamp relative to the start of the capture;
• An arbitration id, which identifies the subject of the message’s contents;
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Table 1. Make, Model, and Year for Each Vehicle in the Dataset
Vehicle Make Model Year
1 Chevrolet Cobalt 2009
2 Chevrolet Silverado 2011
3 Dodge 1500 2014
4 Ford F-150 2017
5 Ford Focus 2010
6 Honda Accord 2012
7 Honda Accord 2015
8 Nissan 370Z 2015
9 Nissan XTERRA 2010
10 Saab 9-7X 2009
11 Toyota Corolla 2009
• A dlc, or data length code, which indicates the number of payload data bytes;
• The hexadecimal data itself; and
• The vehicle’s make, model, and year.
3.2 Classifying Ordered CAN Payload Data
The messages in the CSV file are not immediately suitable for deep learning. Each
message contains no more than eight data bytes (and many contain fewer), and it
is extremely unlikely that so little information can uniquely identify a vehicle. To
address this issue, we build a set of data samples, where each sample contains 1,024
bytes of sequential CAN data from one capture. That is, for each capture, we sort the
messages by timestamp before splitting all hex data into a list of hex bytes, converting
the hex bytes into three-digit integers (for readability), and dividing the list into
samples of 1,024 integers each. Because each integer represents one byte of CAN data,
each sample contains 8× 1024 = 8192 individual data bits. We then write each sample
and the associated vehicle ID to a new CSV file. This makes it more likely that each
sample contains sufficient information and that the underlying CAN data structure is
preserved. Table 2 presents a few examples of these data samples.
The new CSV file contains 28,425 samples from the 11 vehicles. Table 3 illustrates
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the distributions of samples over all vehicles (the number of samples depends primarily
on the length of the data capture). In a balanced dataset, each vehicle would contain
about nine percent of all samples. Clearly, this dataset is not balanced. We address
this class imbalance during model training.
Table 2. Ordered Data — Example Samples
Vehicle Type Ordered Data
3 2014 Dodge 1500 074 166 111 254 255 240 254 . . .
7 2015 Honda Accord 003 212 003 209 003 199 003 . . .
8 2015 Nissan 370Z 255 248 000 128 015 254 030 . . .
Table 3. Ordered Data — Samples Per Vehicle
Vehicle Type Samples Proportion
1 2009 Chevrolet Cobalt 4115 14.48%
2 2011 Chevrolet Silverado 1856 6.53%
3 2014 Dodge 1500 1812 6.37%
4 2017 Ford F-150 2221 7.81%
5 2010 Ford Focus 3806 13.39%
6 2012 Honda Accord 1709 6.01%
7 2015 Honda Accord 2220 7.81%
8 2015 Nissan 370Z 3041 10.70%
9 2010 Nissan XTERRA 2564 9.02%
10 2009 Saab 9-7X 2980 10.48%
11 2009 Toyota Corolla 2101 7.39%
3.2.1 Model Architecture
Using an MLP to classify vehicles is a simple approach, but it is useful to present
this approach’s performance to demonstrate that an attacker does not need complex
methods to adequately classify vehicles. Each CAN sample contains 1,024 data bytes,
so the model receives 8,192 bits as input and outputs one of 11 classes. To identify
the best MLP, we test multiple hyperparameter configurations. The left panel of
Figure 11 displays the best configuration. It has one hidden layer of 512 nodes, and it
uses a relu activation function. The dropout layer sets 20% of its inputs to zero. The
output layer contains 11 nodes, one for each vehicle in the dataset, and uses a softmax
activation function. We compile the model with an Adam optimizer of learning rate
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lr = 0.001 and a categorical cross-entropy loss function. The model has 530,443
parameters, all of which are trainable. In total, we test 27 MLP architectures. Table 4
lists the various options for each hyperparameter used during model construction.
Table 4. Hyperparameter Options for MLP Construction
Hyperparameter Options
Number of Hidden Layers 1, 2, 3
Number of Nodes Per Hidden Layer 128, 256, 512
Optimizer Learning Rate 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001
A more complex approach—a CNN—demonstrates that a sophisticated attacker
can achieve superior performance over the naive approach. The CNN utilizes one-
dimensional convolutional layers because each sample contains one-dimensional data.
In testing, the CNN receives one sample as input and outputs one of the 11 classes.
Like with the MLP, we test multiple hyperparameter configurations before selecting the
best CNN. The best model utilizes a typical CNN structure consisting of convolutional,
pooling, and dropout layers. The right panel of Figure 11 displays the specific
architecture. The convolutional layers each use 32 filters with a kernel size of four,
the pooling layer pools over four elements at each step, and the dropout layer sets
20% of its inputs to zero. The convolutional layers and the first dense layer all use
a relu activation function; the final dense layer uses softmax. We again compile
the model with an Adam optimizer of learning rate lr = 0.001 and a categorical
cross-entropy loss function. The model has 818,427 parameters, and all but 64 are
trainable. In total, we test 18 CNN architectures. Table 5 lists the various options for
each hyperparameter used during model construction.
Table 5. Hyperparameter Options for CNN Construction
Hyperparameter Options
Filters Per Convolutional Layer 32, 64
Kernel Size Per Filter 2, 3, 4
Pooling Size 2, 3, 4
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InputLayer input:output:
(None, 128, 1)
(None, 128, 1)
Conv1D input:output:
(None, 128, 1)
(None, 125, 32)
Conv1D input:output:
(None, 125, 32)
(None, 122, 32)
BatchNormalization input:output:
(None, 122, 32)
(None, 122, 32)
MaxPooling1D input:output:
(None, 122, 32)
(None, 30, 32)
Dropout input:output:
(None, 30, 32)
(None, 30, 32)
Flatten input:output:
(None, 30, 32)
(None, 960)
Dense input:output:
(None, 960)
(None, 100)
Dense input:output:
(None, 100)
(None, 11)
InputLayer input:output:
(None, 128)
(None, 128)
Dense input:output:
(None, 128)
(None, 512)
Dropout input:output:
(None, 512)
(None, 512)
Dense input:output:
(None, 512)
(None, 11)
Figure 11. The best architectures identified in iterative model evaluation processes.
Input to the models consists of sequential CAN bus data. (Left) MLP. (Right) CNN.
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3.2.2 Model Fitting
Table 3 shows that the classes in the full dataset are somewhat imbalanced. For
example, nearly 15% of all samples come from Vehicle 1, but one should expect
each vehicle to contain about 9% of the samples. To address this imbalance, we use
scikit-learn’s class weight module during model training. This tool adjusts weights
to account for the frequency of each class, and thus it ensures that both models can
use all training data without unnecessarily suffering from class imbalance [44]. Still,
we also create a second, balanced dataset by randomly sampling n = 1695 samples
from every vehicle.
Another important tool during model training is Keras’s EarlyStopping callback,
which limits overfitting [45]. This function monitors validation loss and terminates
training if the loss does not improve in 10 epochs. The callback then restores the model
to its best version. This tool also limits model training time. To properly train and
evaluate the models, we split each dataset into three sets: 60% of the samples are used
in training, 20% in validation, and 20% in testing. Scikit-learn’s train test split
enables this split by randomly sampling from the dataset [44]. We train each model on
the training set, terminate training with the early stopping callback (which monitors
the validation set’s loss), and evaluate the trained model on the testing set. However,
these tools do not guarantee optimality, so we also iteratively improve the models
through repeated testing and hyperparameter tuning. A search over a set of possible
hyperparameter configurations ensures we can identify the best classifier. In total,
we evaluate 27 different MLPs and 18 different CNNs. Tables 4 and 5 depict the
hyperparameter options for these models.
Figure 12 shows that the final models possess sufficient capacity for this task. The
validation loss and accuracy for each model are nearly as good as the training loss
and accuracy—especially for the CNNs—and all four losses and accuracies appear to
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reach an asymptote. This means that additional training will not benefit the models,
and it also means that the models are nearly optimal for this task. Note that even
the best MLP struggles to generalize to new data.
Figure 12. Training and validation loss and accuracy over time for the best models.
Input to the models consists of sequential CAN bus data. (Top left) The MLP’s loss.
(Top right) The MLP’s accuracy. (Bottom left) The CNN’s loss. (Bottom right) The
CNN’s accuracy.
To evaluate model performance, we compute balanced accuracy for both the bal-
anced and the imbalanced dataset. This metric considers the various class distributions
when computing the classification accuracy. Even for the balanced dataset, this is
important. Because we randomly sample from the dataset to build the training,
validation, and testing sets, each of those three sets could be imbalanced. Additionally,
we present confusion matrices to allow for an in-depth analysis of where each model
fails. For example, Manufacturer X could use the exact same CAN configuration
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for different vehicles, so even a well-trained model could fail to distinguish between
Manufacturer X’s vehicles. These analyses may even imply a similar CAN structure
across different manufacturers, so the results of these investigations guide further
model modifications and tuning.
3.2.3 Results
The MLP’s performance demonstrates that an intruder with a low-level understand-
ing of deep learning could use this field to better format CAN attacks. The CNN’s
performance shows that a sophisticated intruder can use more advanced techniques to
achieve much better results. Specifically, results indicate that both the MLP and the
CNN can adequately classify CAN data segments, but the CNN is significantly better
than the MLP on both the imbalanced dataset and the balanced dataset. Results also
indicate that both models perform better on the larger, imbalanced dataset; this is
simply due to the availability of training data in each set. Table 6 presents the overall
balanced accuracies for the test set.
Table 6. Ordered Data Test Set — Balanced Accuracy
Model Dataset Accuracy
Multilayer Perceptron Imbalanced 94.46%
Multilayer Perceptron Balanced 67.48%
Convolutional Neural Network Imbalanced 99.64%
Convolutional Neural Network Balanced 95.63%
Table 7 presents class-specific accuracy values for the four trained models. Clearly,
the CNN trained on the imbalanced dataset performs better than the other models on
every class (except Vehicle 5, for which both the CNN and the MLP achieve 100%
accuracy). Additionally, the CNN trained on the balanced dataset outperforms either
version of the MLP on most (10/11) of the classes. This is further evidence of the
superior performance of the CNN, and it also indicates that more training data is
better, even if the classes in the data are imbalanced.
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Table 7. Ordered Data Test Set — Class Accuracy
Vehicle Type MLP, Imbal. MLP, Bal. CNN, Imbal. CNN, Bal. Median
1 2009 Chevrolet Cobalt 97.34% 79.36% 99.88% 98.34% 97.84%
2 2011 Chevrolet Silverado 89.90% 31.07% 100.00% 99.30% 94.60%
3 2014 Dodge 1500 91.32% 56.10% 100.00% 93.77% 92.54%
4 2017 Ford F-150 98.53% 78.12% 100.00% 96.23% 97.38%
5 2010 Ford Focus 99.87% 83.10% 100.00% 98.13% 99.00%
6 2012 Honda Accord 91.25% 77.32% 99.18% 98.99% 95.12%
7 2015 Honda Accord 91.90% 40.72% 99.54% 90.74% 91.32%
8 2015 Nissan 370Z 90.15% 60.70% 98.68% 93.92% 92.03%
9 2010 Nissan XTERRA 94.68% 75.16% 100.00% 99.70% 97.19%
10 2009 Saab 9-7X 100.00% 94.27% 100.00% 96.74% 98.37%
11 2009 Toyota Corolla 95.27% 65.22% 100.00% 97.48% 96.38%
Figure 13 presents the multiclass confusion matrices for both model types on
both datasets. Generally, the models tend to correctly classify CAN segments, but
some specific misclassifications are certainly common. For example, all four trained
models misclassify Vehicle 6 as Vehicle 7 (and vice versa) to some extent; these are
different-year Honda Accords. Additionally, the models usually perform similarly
on the same vehicle. For example, all models demonstrate strong performance on
Vehicle 10—perhaps Saab employed a distinct data structure when designing its 2009
9-7X. Conversely, neither of the MLP models achieve relatively strong performance
on Vehicle 2. One can easily discern other trends by further analyzing Figure 13.
3.3 Classifying Ordered CAN ArbIDs
As Section 3.2 demonstrates, deep learning can effectively determine which vehicle
in a set generated a given segment of raw CAN data. One potential reason why is
that the deep learning models identify the sequential structure of the CAN data—that
is, the models learn to fingerprint vehicles by analyzing the order and frequency of
different CAN payloads. In assuming that this hypothesis is correct, it is natural to
consider the classification performance of models that receive as input segments of
arbitration IDs (ArbIDs) instead of data payloads. Such models could still learn to
identify a vehicle’s unique sequential packet structure, but both the required size of
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Figure 13. Confusion matrices. Input to the models consists of sequential CAN bus
data. (Top left) MLP on the imbalanced dataset. (Top right) MLP on the balanced
dataset. (Bottom left) CNN on the imbalanced dataset. (Bottom right) CNN on the
balanced dataset.
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the training dataset and the time to train the models would decrease. This section
details the methodology and results of such an experiment.
Like the experiment described in Section 3.2, the raw CAN messages require
preprocessing prior to evaluating the deep learning models. We thus construct a set
of ArbID samples; each sample contains 128 ArbIDs in the order they appear on a
vehicle’s CAN bus. To do so, we again sort the messages in each capture by timestamp
before splitting the list of ArbIDs into samples of 128 units; we then write each sample
and the associated vehicle ID to a new CSV file. Table 8 depicts three examples of
these ArbID samples. The CSV file contains 32,508 distinct ArbID samples from the
11 vehicles. Table 9 lists the percentage of samples belonging to each vehicle. As in
Section 3.2’s experiment, we address the class imbalance during model training.
Table 8. Ordered ArbIDs — Example Samples
Vehicle Type Ordered ArbIDs
3 2014 Dodge 1500 11C 118 124 140 202 122 1A0 . . .
7 2015 Honda Accord 1AA 1B0 1D0 1DC 1EA 1ED 320 . . .
8 2015 Nissan 370Z 292 245 216 160 180 182 1F9 . . .
Table 9. Ordered ArbIDs — Samples Per Vehicle
Vehicle Type Samples Proportion
1 2009 Chevrolet Cobalt 4903 15.08%
2 2011 Chevrolet Silverado 2346 7.22%
3 2014 Dodge 1500 1936 5.96%
4 2017 Ford F-150 2221 6.83%
5 2010 Ford Focus 3806 11.71%
6 2012 Honda Accord 1947 5.99%
7 2015 Honda Accord 2735 8.41%
8 2015 Nissan 370Z 3416 10.51%
9 2010 Nissan XTERRA 2874 8.84%
10 2009 Saab 9-7X 3799 11.69%
11 2009 Toyota Corolla 2525 7.77%
3.3.1 Model Architecture
We again evaluate both the naive MLP and the more complex CNN in this
experiment. Each model receives 128 ArbIDs as input and outputs one of the 11
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classes. As in Section 3.2’s experiment, we conduct a search over hyperparameter
configurations for both model types; Tables 4 and 5 present the various options tested.
The optimal MLP has three hidden layers, each of which has 512 nodes and uses
a relu activation function. The dropout layer sets 20% of its inputs to zero, and
the output layer uses a softmax activation function to classify an input as one of
the 11 vehicles. The model, which we compile with an Adam optimizer of learning
rate lr = 0.001 and a categorical cross-entropy loss function, has 597,003 trainable
parameters. The left panel of Figure 14 presents the model’s exact architecture. The
optimal CNN, on the other hand, uses 32 filters, each with a kernel size of two, in
both of its one-dimensional convolutional layers, and its pooling layer aggregates
two elements at each step. The dropout layer sets 20% of its inputs to zero. The
convolutional layers and first dense layer use a relu activation function, and the final
dense layer uses a softmax activation function. We compile the model with an Adam
optimizer of learning rate lr = 0.001 and a categorical cross-entropy loss function.
In total, this CNN has 102,651 trainable parameters. The right panel of Figure 14
depicts the model’s architecture.
3.3.2 Model Fitting
As Table 9 shows, the full dataset disproportionately represents the 11 vehicles.
We again address this class imbalance by 1) utilizing the class weight module when
training on the imbalanced dataset and 2) downsampling to create a second, balanced
dataset. Additionally, we again limit overfitting by defining an EarlyStopping callback
that terminates training after 10 epochs without any improvement in training loss.
Finally, we employ a 60/20/20 ratio to split each dataset into training, validation,
and testing sets. This methodology applies to each version of the MLP and CNN.
In total, we evaluate 27 MLPs and 18 CNNs. As Figure 15 shows, the final models
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InputLayer input:output:
(None, 128, 1)
(None, 128, 1)
Conv1D input:output:
(None, 128, 1)
(None, 127, 32)
Conv1D input:output:
(None, 127, 32)
(None, 126, 32)
BatchNormalization input:output:
(None, 126, 32)
(None, 126, 32)
MaxPooling1D input:output:
(None, 126, 32)
(None, 31, 32)
Dropout input:output:
(None, 31, 32)
(None, 31, 32)
Flatten input:output:
(None, 31, 32)
(None, 992)
Dense input:output:
(None, 992)
(None, 100)
Dense input:output:
(None, 100)
(None, 11)
InputLayer input:output:
(None, 128)
(None, 128)
Dense input:output:
(None, 128)
(None, 512)
Dense input:output:
(None, 512)
(None, 512)
Dense input:output:
(None, 512)
(None, 512)
Dropout input:output:
(None, 512)
(None, 512)
Dense input:output:
(None, 512)
(None, 11)
Figure 14. The best architectures identified in iterative model evaluation processes.
Input to the models consists of sequential CAN bus arbitration IDs. (Left) MLP.
(Right) CNN.
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are well-suited for the classification task. Finally, to evaluate the trained models, we
present balanced accuracies and multiclass confusion matrices.
Figure 15. Training and validation loss and accuracy over time for the best models.
Input to the models consists of sequential CAN bus arbitration IDs. (Top left) The
MLP’s loss. (Top right) The MLP’s accuracy. (Bottom left) The CNN’s loss. (Bottom
right) The CNN’s accuracy.
3.3.3 Results
As in the first experiment, results indicate that the MLP is a sufficient classifier
for the task. On the imbalanced dataset, the MLP achieves a balanced classification
accuracy above 80%. The CNN, however, surpasses 99% on both datasets, so it is once
again the superior classification technique. Table 10 depicts the balanced accuracies
for the four trained models; the results shown are nearly identical to those presented
in Table 6. This supports the hypothesis that the deep learning models learn the
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structure of a vehicle’s CAN data (as opposed to the data’s exact nature). In the
context of this experiment, this means that a bad cyber actor can simply feed the
ArbIDs into a deep learning model, thus allowing for a smaller dataset, a shorter
training period, and faster classification.
Table 10. Ordered ArbIDs Test Set — Balanced Accuracy
Model Dataset Accuracy
Multilayer Perceptron Imbalanced 82.08%
Multilayer Perceptron Balanced 68.16%
Convolutional Neural Network Imbalanced 99.52%
Convolutional Neural Network Balanced 99.05%
Table 11 reveals the class-specific accuracy values for the four trained models. It
is clear that the CNNs are superior to the MLPs for all vehicles in both datasets;
the MLPs do not achieve 98% accuracy on any class, and yet the CNNs surpass 99%
accuracy for nearly every class. Similarly, Figure 16 depicts the four confusion matrices
for the models. Interestingly, the MLP has significant performance differences when
trained on different datasets. For example, misclassification relationships exist between
Vehicles 1 and 7, 2 and 8, and 7 and 8 when the MLP is trained on the balanced
dataset. When it is trained on the imbalanced dataset, these same relationships are
not evident. In other cases, however, the MLP performs similarly on both datasets.
For example, the models often mistake Vehicles 1 and 6 for each other. The same
can be said about Vehicles 2 and 7. To a much lesser extent, one can draw the latter
conclusion about the CNNs, but further analysis of misclassifications by the CNNs is
made difficult by their phenomenal performances.
3.4 Classifying Unordered CAN Payload Data
Section 3.2 shows that deep learning tools can identify which vehicle from a set
generated a given segment of ordered CAN data. Section 3.3 demonstrates the same
capability but for segments of ordered ArbIDs. These abilities may be because the
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100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 97.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.62 99.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 99.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40
0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.78 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 98.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.38 0.00 0.51 0.89 0.13 0.38 97.72 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.38 0.51 98.72 0.00 0.00
0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.61 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.87
Figure 16. Confusion matrices. Input to the models consists of sequential CAN bus
arbitration IDs. (Top left) MLP on the imbalanced dataset. (Top right) MLP on the
balanced dataset. (Bottom left) CNN on the imbalanced dataset. (Bottom right) CNN
on the balanced dataset.
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Table 11. Ordered ArbIDs Test Set — Class Accuracy
Vehicle Type MLP, Imbal. MLP, Bal. CNN, Imbal. CNN, Bal. Median
1 2009 Chevrolet Cobalt 73.40% 49.88% 99.90% 99.73% 86.57%
2 2011 Chevrolet Silverado 76.14% 39.94% 96.26% 99.74% 86.20%
3 2014 Dodge 1500 87.70% 93.66% 95.54% 99.48% 94.60%
4 2017 Ford F-150 97.49% 80.97% 99.77% 99.74% 98.62%
5 2010 Ford Focus 93.59% 68.23% 100.00% 99.62% 96.60%
6 2012 Honda Accord 81.08% 53.32% 99.00% 99.87% 90.04%
7 2015 Honda Accord 72.53% 50.17% 97.61% 99.87% 85.07%
8 2015 Nissan 370Z 87.24% 60.46% 99.81% 98.49% 92.86%
9 2010 Nissan XTERRA 85.42% 76.26% 99.85% 98.81% 92.12%
10 2009 Saab 9-7X 95.82% 76.63% 100.00% 100.00% 97.91%
11 2009 Toyota Corolla 90.96% 97.30% 100.00% 100.00% 98.65%
deep learning models identify the underlying structure of the CAN data—that is, the
models identify the payload organization and frequencies unique to each of an OEM’s
vehicles. This may imply that the sequential structure of the CAN segments analyzed
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 is irrelevant. For this reason, this experiment evaluates whether
randomized CAN payload data can effectively fingerprint a vehicle. Here, randomized
means that we simply shuffle each list of hex bytes described in Section 3.2 before
splitting the list into samples. Although a bad cyber actor is unlikely to process
collected data in such a way, the results presented in Section 3.4.3 illustrate that the
deep learning models do seem to identify the CAN structure, and this thus provides
valuable insight into the nature of CAN data and design.
Because the quantity of data in each capture does not change, the generated
CSV file contains 28,425 samples, the same number as the file generated in the first
experiment. Likewise, the sample distribution over the 11 classes for this experiment
is identical to the first experiment’s distribution. Table 12 depicts this distribution,
and Table 13 presents a few examples of the randomized CAN samples. Once again,
we address the obvious class imbalance during model training. As expected, it is
difficult to discern differences between these samples and those presented in Table 2
because the data formatting process does not alter the data bytes themselves—only
the order in which the bytes appear.
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Table 12. Unordered Data — Samples Per Vehicle
Vehicle Type Samples Proportion
1 2009 Chevrolet Cobalt 4115 14.48%
2 2011 Chevrolet Silverado 1856 6.53%
3 2014 Dodge 1500 1812 6.37%
4 2017 Ford F-150 2221 7.81%
5 2010 Ford Focus 3806 13.39%
6 2012 Honda Accord 1709 6.01%
7 2015 Honda Accord 2220 7.81%
8 2015 Nissan 370Z 3041 10.70%
9 2010 Nissan XTERRA 2564 9.02%
10 2009 Saab 9-7X 2980 10.48%
11 2009 Toyota Corolla 2101 7.39%
Table 13. Unordered Data — Example Samples
Vehicle Type Unordered Data
3 2014 Dodge 1500 255 000 015 007 000 017 000 . . .
7 2015 Honda Accord 010 254 000 127 249 000 000 . . .
8 2015 Nissan 370Z 040 000 123 000 000 000 144 . . .
3.4.1 Model Architecture
Like before, we compare the MLP’s performance to that of a CNN. As in the first
experiment, the models each receive as samples 1,024 three-digit hexadecimal data
bytes extracted from CAN messages. The models classify each sample as one of the
11 vehicles described in Section 3.1. We iteratively construct these models using the
parameters listed in Tables 4 and 5. The optimal MLP has three 256-node hidden
layers that each utilize a relu activation function. These layers are followed by a 20%
dropout layer and an 11-node softmax output layer. It is compiled with an Adam
optimizer of learning rate lr = 0.001 and a categorical cross-entropy loss function
and has 396,811 trainable parameters. The best CNN utilizes two one-dimensional
convolutional layers, each of which uses 32 filters of size two; one pooling layer, which
pools over two elements at a time; and one dropout layer, which zeroes 20% of its
inputs. The output layer uses a softmax activation function, and the rest of the layers
use a relu activation function. The model monitors categorical cross-entropy loss and
employs an Adam optimizer of learning rate lr = 0.001. It has 1,091,515 parameters,
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only 64 of which are non-trainable. The left and right panels of Figure 17 depict the
architectures for the optimal MLP and CNN, respectively.
3.4.2 Model Fitting
The classes in the dataset are disproportionately represented; Table 12 shows the
exact sample counts for each class. We employ the same methods as before—namely,
the class weight module and the creation of a second, balanced dataset—to mitigate
the effects of this imbalance. We again utilize Keras’s EarlyStopping callback to
reduce overfitting, and we also split the dataset into training, validation, and testing
sets before evaluating each of the 27 MLP configurations and 18 CNN configurations
using the parameters depicted in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. Figure 18 shows that the
final versions of each model type are capable of effectively classifying CAN samples.
3.4.3 Results
Once again, the experimental results indicate that both model types can adequately
classify CAN samples. However, the performances in this experiment are noticeably
worse than in either of the previous experiments. As Table 14 illustrates, the optimal
MLP achieves 59.26% balanced classification accuracy, far lower than the 94.46%
and 82.08% accuracies achieved in the first two experiments.8 Similarly, training the
models on ordered data or ArbIDs allows for a balanced accuracy of 99.64% or 99.52%,
respectively, for the CNN; when trained on unordered data, the CNN’s performance
dips slightly to 98.83%. Table 15 depicts the models’ class accuracy for each vehicle.
Both versions of the MLP suffer on several classes, but the CNN, when trained on the
full dataset, attains 96.98% or better classification accuracy for every vehicle. Finally,
Figure 19 contains the confusion matrices for the four models. Clearly, the MLP
trained on the full dataset performs well on some vehicles, like 3, 6, and 9, but the
8All accuracy values refer to the given model’s performance on the imbalanced dataset.
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InputLayer input:output:
(None, 128, 1)
(None, 128, 1)
Conv1D input:output:
(None, 128, 1)
(None, 127, 32)
Conv1D input:output:
(None, 127, 32)
(None, 126, 32)
BatchNormalization input:output:
(None, 126, 32)
(None, 126, 32)
MaxPooling1D input:output:
(None, 126, 32)
(None, 42, 32)
Dropout input:output:
(None, 42, 32)
(None, 42, 32)
Flatten input:output:
(None, 42, 32)
(None, 1344)
Dense input:output:
(None, 1344)
(None, 100)
Dense input:output:
(None, 100)
(None, 11)
InputLayer input:output:
(None, 128)
(None, 128)
Dense input:output:
(None, 128)
(None, 256)
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(None, 256)
(None, 256)
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(None, 256)
(None, 256)
Dropout input:output:
(None, 256)
(None, 256)
Dense input:output:
(None, 256)
(None, 11)
Figure 17. The best architectures identified in iterative model evaluation processes.
Input to the models consists of CAN bus data in a random order. (Left) MLP. (Right)
CNN.
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Figure 18. Training and validation loss and accuracy over time for the best models.
Input to the models consists of CAN bus data in a random order. (Top left) The
MLP’s loss. (Top right) The MLP’s accuracy. (Bottom left) The CNN’s loss. (Bottom
right) The CNN’s accuracy.
other MLP only demonstrates strong performance on Vehicle 3. Comparatively, both
MLPs perform relatively poorly on a majority of the vehicles, including 2, 3, 5, 7, 8,
and 10.9 Certainly, both CNNs surpass either MLP. When trained on the balanced
dataset, the CNN achieves 80% accuracy on four classes. The CNN trained on the
full dataset benefits from its increased model capacity and quantity of training data,
because it exceeds 96% accuracy on every vehicle.
These results—especially for the CNN—show that deep learning models can
effectively classify unordered CAN data. This implies that the models do in fact
learn to identify structural characteristics of the data, like the commonly used byte
9It is important to note that both MLPs still outperform a random guess approach, which should
only correctly classify about 9% of the samples from a given dataset.
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75.46 0.50 0.00 4.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.32 0.00 12.76 0.00
0.00 38.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.18 42.86 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 92.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.20 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 5.60 52.52 0.00 30.22 0.00 0.00 5.12 6.55
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 89.14 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.59
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.38 0.00 46.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 38.46
19.39 23.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 46.08 11.23 0.00 0.00
0.17 18.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.20 75.39 0.00 0.00
2.95 0.00 0.00 36.20 10.61 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 49.41 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.85 11.06 17.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 68.03
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29.00 1.16 0.00 0.23 2.55 0.00 31.79 16.71 0.23 18.33 0.00
0.22 25.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.69 0.00 21.18 23.80 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 95.69 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 4.02 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 33.46 25.97 0.00 7.11 0.00 15.07 11.28 7.11
0.00 0.00 0.00 32.20 28.81 0.00 23.73 0.00 1.69 0.00 13.56
0.00 0.00 46.10 0.00 0.00 46.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.63
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9.77 15.60 0.00 0.00 0.19 11.56 6.39 49.91 4.51 2.07 0.00
0.00 15.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.55 0.00 3.74 52.72 0.00 0.00
7.90 0.00 0.00 15.05 15.88 0.00 9.41 0.98 14.15 36.64 0.00
0.00 0.00 5.14 9.04 12.27 4.98 21.23 0.00 0.66 0.41 46.27
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96.98 1.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 1.09 0.00 0.00
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.74 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.94 1.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.35 0.00 98.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.49 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.18 0.00 0.00
0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.18 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.77
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87.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.68 0.00 2.35 0.00 0.00 7.72 0.00
5.18 85.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.63 4.66 1.30 0.00 0.00
0.00 1.19 75.67 0.00 0.00 19.29 0.00 1.48 0.89 0.00 1.48
0.00 0.00 0.38 74.95 7.21 0.00 0.95 0.19 6.07 0.00 10.25
0.23 0.00 0.12 13.22 54.27 0.00 19.30 0.00 0.00 4.21 8.65
0.00 0.00 19.64 0.00 0.00 64.80 0.42 13.88 0.42 0.00 0.84
0.00 0.14 1.72 9.33 3.87 3.16 70.30 0.00 3.73 0.00 7.75
0.00 0.15 0.00 2.75 3.51 8.24 0.61 79.08 2.29 3.36 0.00
6.96 0.68 0.00 6.41 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.91 81.04 2.46 0.41
0.12 0.00 0.00 5.32 19.28 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 73.79 1.36
0.00 0.00 2.45 3.68 1.23 1.23 1.23 0.00 0.00 0.20 89.98
Figure 19. Confusion matrices. Input to the models consists of CAN bus data in a
random order. (Top left) MLP on the imbalanced dataset. (Top right) MLP on the
balanced dataset. (Bottom left) CNN on the imbalanced dataset. (Bottom right) CNN
on the balanced dataset.
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Table 14. Unordered Data Test Set — Balanced Accuracy
Model Dataset Accuracy
Multilayer Perceptron Imbalanced 59.26%
Multilayer Perceptron Balanced 42.04%
Convolutional Neural Network Imbalanced 98.83%
Convolutional Neural Network Balanced 75.22%
Table 15. Unordered Data Test Set — Class Accuracy
Vehicle Type MLP, Imbal. MLP, Bal. CNN, Imbal. CNN, Bal. Median
1 2009 Chevrolet Cobalt 75.46% 29.00% 96.98% 87.25% 81.36%
2 2011 Chevrolet Silverado 38.96% 25.11% 100.00% 85.23% 62.10%
3 2014 Dodge 1500 92.80% 95.69% 100.00% 75.67% 94.25%
4 2017 Ford F-150 0.00% 33.46% 100.00% 74.95% 54.21%
5 2010 Ford Focus 52.52% 28.81% 99.74% 54.27% 53.39%
6 2012 Honda Accord 89.14% 46.27% 97.94% 64.80% 76.97%
7 2015 Honda Accord 46.15% 50.00% 98.65% 70.30% 60.15%
8 2015 Nissan 370Z 46.08% 49.91% 100.00% 79.08% 64.50%
9 2010 Nissan XTERRA 75.39% 52.72% 99.18% 81.04% 78.21%
10 2009 Saab 9-7X 49.41% 36.64% 98.18% 73.79% 61.60%
11 2009 Toyota Corolla 68.03% 46.27% 98.77% 89.98% 79.00%
values and their frequencies. As stated at the start of this section, someone hoping
to fingerprint vehicles with CAN data is not likely to randomize the bytes as we did.
However, in identifying why the models still correctly classify unordered samples, one
enables a deeper analysis of an OEM’s CAN design choices and tendencies.
3.5 Distinguishing CAN Data with Siamese Neural Networks
We also briefly explored Siamese neural network (SNN) applications to this work.
Given enough training data, an SNN can distinguish new cars—that is, those not
present in the original training set—because it learns during training whether two
observations come from the same source or from different sources. However, our
attempts did not prove fruitful. It seems that an SNN with a contrastive loss function
does not possess the capacity required to determine same/not same for two CAN
samples. We contend that a network with a triplet loss function may succeed, but,
in our exploratory efforts, the loss consistently centered around the margin α for all
network configurations. Although a more in-depth analysis of this topic is outside the
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scope of this thesis, future researchers may wish to advance these efforts. They should
consider the following modifications:
• Utilize a batch-hard triplet generation methodology to ensure the triplets suffi-
ciently train the model (i.e., so the triplets are nontrivial); and
• Implement a weighted loss function to penalize those losses that collapse to α.
Demonstrating that an SNN can effectively fingerprint CAN samples would confirm
the security and privacy risks to the vehicle’s operator and passengers. Specifically,
because an SNN is more powerful than the MLPs and CNNs we evaluated, and because
this research already illustrates the risks present in the network’s design, an SNN that
can fingerprint vehicles is simply a more robust tool for the CAN intruder.
3.6 Summary
This chapter discussed a corpus of CAN data and three separate experiments, each
of which demonstrated an effective classification approach for these data. Section 3.2
described the first experiment, in which we generated 1,024-byte samples of ordered
payload data for each of 11 vehicles. Section 3.3 examined the second experiment, in
which we generated samples consisting of 128 ordered ArbIDs. Section 3.4 considered
the third experiment, in which we extracted the ordered payload data, as in the first
experiment, and then shuffled the data bytes before partitioning them into 1,024-byte
samples. In each experiment, we constructed and trained multiple versions of two
disparate deep learning classifiers, one an MLP and the other a CNN, before using
these classifiers to identify which of the 11 vehicles generated each sample. In all cases,
the experimental results indicated that deep learning models can effectively classify
the samples. Section 5.1 discusses the real-world implications of these findings.
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IV. EDM as a Component of an Intrusion Detection System
Chapters I and II introduced intrusion detection systems (IDSs), which mitigate
cyber-physical system (CPS) vulnerabilities like those discussed in Chapter III. This
chapter discusses how two different time series analysis techniques can contribute
to IDS development. The first, Granger causality, is a well-known, relatively simple
statistical method for quantifying the causality in a system. The second, empirical
dynamic modeling (EDM), is a small-but-growing technique for analyzing the dynamics,
to include the causality, of a system. The remainder of this chapter discusses the
nature and origins of the data. It then describes the computational methodology of
Granger causality and EDM before finally analyzing the results of applying these
techniques to the data.
4.1 Experimental Data & Analysis
We utilize two statistical analysis tools to develop insights into a system’s charac-
teristics, including its nonlinearity, deterministic chaos, and causality. This section
describes the experimental data and the techniques used to analyze the data.
4.1.1 Data
This research utilizes data from two simulated CPSs. The first simulated dataset
represents the effect of an automobile’s steering wheel angle over time on the revolutions
per minute (RPM) measurements for the turning wheels. The second dataset consists
of captured nonlinear data generated by the Avionics Vulnerability Assessment System
(AVAS), an Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)-developed flight simulator that employs
real-world physics and flight dynamics for research purposes. The steering dataset
is considered to be linear because the relationship between each pair of time series
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is linear or nearly linear. Specifically, the relationship between the two wheel RPMs
is linear, and the relationships between the steering input and each wheel RPM are
almost linear.10 Similarly, the AVAS dataset is nonlinear because the relationships
between the time series are nonlinear. The datasets allow us to evaluate the utility of
both Granger causality and EDM when used to analyze linear systems and nonlinear
systems. Although simpler methods may enable effective analysis of linear systems,
many CPSs of interest are nonlinear.
4.1.1.1 Linear Data
To properly assess both Granger causality and EDM, we construct a dataset
representative of a linear system. It is expected that the analysis techniques make
better predictions and identify stronger relationships when evaluating time series that
are linearly linked. The variables describing the steering wheel angle and RPMs of the
turning wheels in a passenger vehicle constitute such a system. We generate these time
series with Python 3.7 for a vehicle with the following characteristics: a 15-inch wheel
radius, including the tire; a 72-inch wheelbase; a 60-inch track; a maximum steering
wheel turning angle of 360 degrees; a steering ratio of 8:1 (and thus a maximum wheel
angle of 45 degrees); and a constant forward speed of 25 miles per hour. Under these
assumptions, a sum of sines function loosely represents some hypothetical driving
scenario. That is, the Steering line in Figure 20 serves as a potential steering wheel
angle time series, and we directly compute the inside and outside wheel RPMs using
Equations (1) and (2), respectively.11 Note that, if the steering wheel angle θ < 0, the
left wheel is the inside wheel; otherwise, the right wheel is to the inside. Table 16
defines the variables used in the equations.
10That is, the latter two relationships are linear for steering wheel angles of relatively small
magnitude but grow in nonlinearity as the steering wheel angle’s magnitude increases.
11The interested reader may inspect the derivations of these equations in Appendix A.
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Figure 20. Plots of the steering system time series.
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Table 16. Variable Definitions for the RPM Equations
Variable Meaning Defined Value
r wheel radius 15 inches
b wheelbase 12 inches
k track 60 inches
t steering ratio 8:1
s forward speed 25 miles per hour
θ current steering wheel angle not applicable
This steering system is rather rudimentary—it doesn’t account for the physical
properties of a real system, including the effects of other relevant variables—but even
its simplistic nature may allow us to draw conclusions concerning EDM’s applications
to linear CPSs. The empirical results shown in Figure 21 confirm that the time series
from the model are fairly linearly related.12 Because the values of the variables cover
12The somewhat nonlinear behavior between either wheel and the steering wheel is due to the
mechanics of a standard automobile’s Ackermann steering mechanism.
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significantly different ranges, we standardize all variables with R’s scale function13
to ensure each is equally important during analysis.
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Figure 21. Scatter plots demonstrating the relationship between each pair of variables
in the steering system time series.
4.1.1.2 Nonlinear Data
To create the second dataset, we guided an AVAS-simulated aircraft through
takeoff, low-altitude cruising, and multiple shallow banked turns. Our data collection
yielded 7,582 observations from a 14-minute flight. Each observation includes seven
different flying metrics and a timestamp relative to the start of the simulation. The
metrics are roll and pitch (each in radians),14 altitude (in feet), and airspeed and
velocity in each of the three coordinate axes (in feet per second). The roll and pitch
values range from -180◦ to 180◦; altitude, airspeed, and the directional velocities are
all floating point values.15
As with the linear dataset, we z-scale the variables prior to analysis. We then
select a subset of the variables—airspeed, altitude, and pitch—before conducting the
13For some time series X, the function z-scales X by subtracting its mean and then dividing it by
its standard deviation.
14We exclude yaw because, in the AVAS, yaw is simply a measurement of the plane’s heading
relative to north. In other words, it is not a characteristic of the plane’s dynamics.
15Airspeed and altitude are both nonnegative.
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analyses. Other subsets of the eight variables likely exhibit the desired dynamics, but
it is expected that these three variables best demonstrate a tightly coupled system.
Figure 22 presents the three time series, prior to scaling, in one plot. It is important
to note that scaling the variables does not guarantee the successful application of
Granger causality analysis; the technique assumes the variables under analysis exhibit
linear dynamics, but Figure 23 clearly illustrates that the system is highly nonlinear.
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Figure 22. Plots of the selected AVAS time series.
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Figure 23. Scatter plots demonstrating the relationship between each pair of variables
in the AVAS time series.
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4.1.2 Granger Causality
StatsModels’s grangercausalitytests, which evaluates the null hypothesis “X
does not Granger-cause Y ”, quantifies the Granger non-causality present in each
system. Input to this function includes the two time series to be evaluated, of course,
but it also includes a maxlag parameter, which indicates the maximum number of
time steps to lag, or offset, the X time series. The function computes the system’s
Granger non-causality for all lag values from one to maxlag (inclusive). Output from
this function includes the statistical p-values concerning the results of four different
tests for Granger non-causality; if the average p-value is less than 0.05, we reject the
null hypothesis and assert that X Granger-causes Y [46].
4.1.3 EDM Techniques
Ye et al. suggest the following sequence of EDM techniques to best interpret a
dataset’s characteristics [33]:
1. Conduct nearest neighbor forecasting via simplex projection to identify the
embedding dimension E that maximizes the prediction skill ρ [47];
2. Use simplex projection and E to determine whether the system exhibits deter-
ministic chaos;
3. Employ sequential locally weighted global linear maps (S-maps) to characterize
any nonlinearity present in the data [48]; and
4. Utilize convergent cross mapping (CCM) to generate shadow manifolds, evaluate
predictive accuracy, and quantify causality [34].
In essence, “simplex projection is the process of iteratively selecting [a point] Yt in a
shadow manifold and b other points whose histories over time t are most similar to the
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currently selected point ... A simplex is a generalization of a triangle or tetrahedron to
an arbitrary number of dimensions” [12, 47, 49]. One then uses the weighted average
of the future values of the b other points to make predictions about future values of Yt.
The difference between these predictions and the actual future values gives a forecast
skill ρ. By repeating this process with shadow manifolds of different dimensionalities,
one can identify the embedding dimension E that optimizes ρ [50]. The (strong)
Whitney embedding theorem says the following [51]:
Theorem. Any m-manifold of class CR (r ≥ 1 finite or infinite) may be imbedded
[sic] by a regular Cr-map in E2m, and by such a map in a one-one manner in E2m+1.
In simpler terms, the theorem states that the embedding dimension E for an
attractor manifold has an upper bound of 2D + 1, where D is the true dimension (the
number of variables) of the system [12, 50]. One can thus use simplex projection to
definitively identify the optimal E in a finite amount of time.
S-map projection is another iterative process, but it instead uses all neighboring
points to create linear regression vectors. By aggregating these regression vectors,
one approximates an n-dimensional spline. One then compares this spline to the
shadow manifold attractor to measure ρ [48, 49, 50]. When generating the regression
estimates, a nonlinear tuning parameter θ weights the neighbors with respect to their
distance to the current focal point Yt. Finally, “if ρ is maximized when θ = 0, then the
time series may be assumed to belong to a simple linear system instead of a dynamic
system” [12, 48, 50].
As Stone et al. claim, “This process provides insight into the true dimensionality of
the dynamic system responsible for generating [observational] data without requiring
complete understanding of the system itself” [12]. Accurate knowledge of E is a
prerequisite to effectively applying CCM to multiple time series to detect causality.
Alternatively, a proper S-map analysis of time series relationships may indicate whether
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these relationships belong to a simple linear system. If so, computationally simpler
methods, like Granger causality or auto-regressive linear models, could replace the
more complex CCM technique in detecting causality [1, 33, 48]. Finally, knowledge
of the dimensionality of a system may assist in creating a high quality model of said
system. Such a model—and the results of a causality analysis—likely enables an
effective IDS for various CPSs.
To conduct this analysis, we use the Sugihara Laboratory’s rEDM repository on
GitHub. This codebase enables EDM analysis using the R programming language.
The repository includes the following functions (among others):
• simplex, which corresponds to the first and second EDM techniques;
• s map, which corresponds to the third EDM technique; and
• ccm and ccm means, which correspond to the fourth EDM technique.
These functions, together with a few helper functions, facilitate effective EDM
analysis. Appendix B details the code used to apply EDM to the steering dataset and
to plot the results of the analysis. Section 4.2 depicts the results of the EDM and
Granger causality analyses. Section 5.2 discusses the implications of these results. For
the interested reader, Rennie provides an in-depth description of EDM, to include the
mathematics behind simplex projection, S-map analysis, and CCM [52].
4.2 Results
This section presents the results of the Granger causality and EDM analyses
for both datasets. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 show that, for a linear dataset, Granger
causality enables a somewhat effective causality analysis but that EDM does not.
Conversely, for nonlinear data, Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 present an ineffective use of
Granger causality and a more effective use of EDM.
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4.2.1 Linear Data — Granger Causality
Figure 24 depicts, for 20 different lags, the Granger causality p-value between each
pair of time series in the linear dataset. Each p-value is the average of the p-values for
four different Granger causality tests for a specific lag parameter. For example, when
steering wheel angle is lagged by one second (relative to left wheel RPM), the average
p-value when using left wheel RPM to predict steering wheel angle is 0.7818. We only
reject the null hypothesis16 when p < 0.05, so this means that left wheel RPM does
not Granger-cause a one-second-delayed steering wheel angle.
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Figure 24. Granger causality between each pair of steering system time series.
Figure 24 also shows the limitations of Granger causality. For example, according
to the figure, steering wheel angle Granger-causes both wheel RPMs when the RPM
series is lagged by two or more seconds. This is somewhat consistent with a standard
automobile’s dynamics. However, it is not expected that the RPMs cause steering
wheel angle, but Granger-causality asserts that they do when the steering angle is
lagged by two, three, or eight to twelve seconds. This is a limitation of the technique;
the result is simply due to the similarity of the time series and is not actually indicative
of the steering system’s relevant dynamics. The results do provide some insight in
general, but this insight is likely not sufficient for suitable IDS design.
16As a reminder, the null hypothesis is “X does not Granger-cause Y .”
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4.2.2 Linear Data — EDM
To effectively apply CCM to make predictions and quantify causality, we require
knowledge of the optimal embedding dimension E for each time series in the system.
By iteratively utilizing simplex projection to quantify predictive accuracy at different
values for E, we identify the optimal value. Figure 25 illustrates the results of this
process for each steering system time series. Although the differences in forecast skill,
or ρ,17 are difficult to discern, numerically, ρ is maximized for each time series when
E = 2. However, it is important to note that, because the values are all so similar,
the choice of E is largely irrelevant in this particular case. Still, we let E = 2 for the
remainder of the EDM analysis techniques. To be clear, this means the techniques
construct a two-dimensional shadow manifold, where each dimension is a time series
lagged by some multiple of τ . When predicting steering wheel angle, for example,
EDM constructs a shadow manifold using steering wheel angle and one copy of steering
wheel angle, where the copy is lagged by τ . For this dataset, we let τ equal one second.
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Figure 25. Plots illustrating the optimal embedding dimension for each steering system
time series.
If we keep E constant and vary the time to prediction tp, simplex projection
enables an analysis of a system’s deterministic chaos (or lack thereof). Figure 26
17Forecast skill is a measure of the ability to forecast future values of a given time series.
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shows how ρ remains constant as tp increases for each of the three time series. In other
words, the ability to make predictions further in the future is essentially the same as
for those closer in time, which indicates non-chaotic behavior for the three variables.
This is due to the nature of the simulated steering system: the steering wheel angle
consists of a set of fairly predictable points over time, and the left and right wheel
RPMs are directly computed from those points. For this reason, the system is not
likely to exhibit chaotic behavior, and EDM confirms this. EDM does not enable a
deeper analysis of the system’s chaos.
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Figure 26. Plots illustrating the deterministic chaos present in each steering system
time series.
S-map analysis fits local linear maps to the system to describe its nonlinearity. This
is different from simplex projection, which analyzes each point’s nearest neighbors. By
varying the nonlinearity tuning parameter θ in the S-map function call and plotting
against ρ, we obtain the plots shown in Figure 27. When θ = 0, S-map equally weights
all points; as θ increases, the function more heavily weights points close to the point
under analysis. Thus, when θ is higher, the function assumes more nonlinearity in
the system. However, for all three variables and for every value of θ, ρ is effectively
equal to one. This indicates the absence of nonlinearity in each time series. For this
linear system, it seems that EDM’s nonlinearity analysis is not particularly useful.
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It is possible that the analysis does pertain to more robust linear systems, but this
requires further research.
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Figure 27. Plots illustrating the nonlinearity of each steering system time series.
EDM also enables next-point predictions. Figure 28 overlays these predictions on
each time series. Clearly, these predictions are extremely accurate, which indicates
that the three variables do not change significantly from one observation to the next.
Each plot also shows the prediction variance by way of a shaded polygon, but the
variance is so low that the polygons are all-but-invisible. Remember that Figure 26
already implied this: for every value of tp, ρ is very high. Additionally, we devised
a naive prediction model. This model simply predicts that the point at time t + 1
has the same value as the point at time t. In other words, the simple model predicts
no change for the next value. Figure 29 depicts the prediction errors (residuals) for
both models; the majority of these errors are small, especially for EDMs. Table 17
numerically compares the root-mean-square error (RMSE) between the naive model
and EDM. As the table illustrates, EDM outperforms the baseline predictor for each
time series, but one must consider the significant increase in computational complexity
for EDM. Finally, these time series are incapable of large, instantaneous changes, so
accurately predicting the next point is not very impressive and is not often useful in
practical applications. However, these predictions could still assist in IDSs for CPSs
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of sufficiently low complexity. Of course, methods other than EDM may also suffice
for linear systems.
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Figure 28. Plots illustrating the predictions for each steering system time series.
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Figure 29. Plots illustrating the prediction error for each steering system time series
for both the EDM predictor and the naive predictor.
Table 17. RMSE for Each Steering System Time Series
Time Series Naive Prediction RMSE EDM Prediction RMSE
Steering wheel angle 0.009424 0.003351
Left wheel RPM 0.005742 0.003893
Right wheel RPM 0.005742 0.003893
Figure 30 depicts inter-variable dynamics within the system. The figure plots
cross-map skill ρ18 against library size—the number of points used to compute ρ—for
18Cross-map skill quantifies the ability to use one shadow manifold to identify values in another.
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each pair of variables. Each plot contains two lines, one for X xmap Y and one for
Y xmap X. Here, X xmap Y refers to the CCM analysis technique which uses the
shadow manifold of X to forecast the shadow manifold of Y . For a given library size,
the resulting value for ρ indicates this predictive capability. The three plots show
that ρ is equivalent across library sizes and in both directions for every pair of time
series. This means that steering information is encoded in the RPM data and that
RPM information is similarly encoded in the steering data, which in turn implies an
expected causal effect in both directions. Unfortunately, it appears that EDM does
not enable insight concerning pairwise causality for this dataset.
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Figure 30. Plots illustrating the causality between each pair of steering system time
series.
Finally, Figure 31 depicts the system’s causality through time. The lines again
represent the results of using X to forecast Y , but we now plot ρ against tp. As
previous Sugihara Lab researcher Hao Ye writes, “Note here that negative values of tp
... indicate that past values of Y are best cross-mapped from the reconstructed state
of X. This suggests a dynamical signal that appears first in Y and later in X, and is
consistent with Y causing X” [53]. When tp is positive, the opposite holds. For this
system, regardless of tp and of the variables in question, ρ ≈ 1. Thus, according to
EDM, each variable has a strong causal effect on every other variable regardless of
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the time to prediction. This is unlikely, and it supports the claim that EDM does not
appear to enable sophisticated analysis of the system’s causality.
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Figure 31. Plots illustrating predictive capability by analyzing the causality between
each pair of steering system time series.
4.2.3 Nonlinear Data — Granger Causality
Figure 32 depicts the Granger causality for the selected AVAS time series. Because
the system follows nonlinear dynamics, the analysis afforded by the Granger causality
functions is inferior to that of Section 4.2.1. Successful application of the technique
assumes linear dynamics, but altitude, airspeed, and pitch form a highly nonlinear
system. This nonlinearity confuses the causality equations and gives a p-value less than
0.05 for each of the 120 results, which in turn implies that any of the system’s variables
Granger-causes any other variable for at least 20 seconds. This is not intuitive, and it
does not lead to a better understanding of the variable interactions. For example, it is
not likely that an airplane’s airspeed causally affects its altitude—the two variables
can be correlated, of course—but Granger causality asserts that it does. Furthermore,
Granger causality assumes direct causality and is unable to account for secondary
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interactions between time series.19 This maintains Clive Granger’s original assumption
that the technique does not apply well to nonlinear systems.
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Figure 32. Granger causality between each pair of selected AVAS time series.
4.2.4 Nonlinear Data — EDM
For each of the three AVAS time series, Figure 33 presents the forecast skill ρ
for various embedding dimensions E. Visually, differences in ρ are minuscule, but
the optimal embedding dimension is two for each series. We thus let E = 2 for the
remainder of the EDM analysis techniques in this section. Additionally, we again let
τ equal the time between two observations in a given time series: one second.
Figure 34 plots the forecast skill ρ against the time to prediction tp to illustrate the
system’s deterministic chaos. For each time series, the figure shows that predictions
further in the future are less accurate than earlier predictions. Clearly, this effect is
strongest for pitch and weakest for altitude, but this is evidence of chaotic behavior
for all three variables.
As before, we plot ρ against θ to characterize each variable’s nonlinearity. Figure 35
shows these plots. For all three variables, ρ ≈ 1 for every tuning parameter; this implies
19If A causes B and B causes C, then A causes C. Granger causality can fail to identify the
relationship between A and C. Alternatively, Granger causality may identify causality between X
and Y (in either direction) when in fact both are caused by Z.
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Figure 33. Plots illustrating the optimal embedding dimension for each selected AVAS
time series.
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Figure 34. Plots illustrating the deterministic chaos present in each selected AVAS
time series.
the absence of nonlinear dynamics in the time series. This is not an intuitive result
for a system with demonstrated nonlinearity. For this reason, we cannot definitively
claim the presence or absence of nonlinear dynamics.
Figure 36 presents the next-point predictions given by EDM for each time series.
Unsurprisingly, the variance in the predictions—as shown by the nearly imperceptible
shaded polygon—is slight. As Figure 34 strongly indicated, none of the variables
change significantly between a pair of observations. Figure 37, which depicts the
prediction errors, confirms that EDM’s predictions are highly accurate, and it also
64
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Airspeed
Fo
re
ca
st
 S
kil
l
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Altitude
Nonlinearity Tuning Parameter
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Pitch
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 35. Plots illustrating the nonlinearity of each selected AVAS time series.
confirms that EDM again outperforms the simple model. Table 18 presents the RMSEs
for both models. It is clear that EDM vastly outperforms the baseline model for
two of the three time series; although the simple predictor performs better for pitch,
the difference in RMSEs is insignificant. It is once again possible that even these
short-term predictions could assist in IDS development. However, it is important to
note an obvious limitation of EDM predictions: the technique cannot foresee values
not contained in the library. This explains the large outlier predictions.
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Figure 36. Plots illustrating the predictions for each selected AVAS time series.
Figure 38 depicts cross-map skill for each pair of time series. The leftmost plot
shows that airspeed’s manifold can effectively forecast altitude’s but that the opposite
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Figure 37. Plots illustrating the prediction error for each selected AVAS time series
for both the EDM predictor and the naive predictor.
Table 18. RMSE for Each Selected AVAS Time Series
Time Series Naive Prediction RMSE EDM Prediction RMSE
Airspeed 3.907005 0.070161
Altitude 18.192201 0.001535
Pitch 0.013749 0.019748
relationship is noticeably weaker. The middle plot shows that the difference in cross-
map skill between airspeed xmap pitch and pitch xmap airspeed decreases as library
size increases. The rightmost plot shows a more extreme case of this: above a certain
library size, cross-map skill for altitude xmap pitch surpasses cross-map skill for pitch
xmap altitude. Furthermore, the pairwise relationships weaken as we examine the
plots from left to right. Finally, in all cases, the results indicate diminishing returns in
improving ρ by increasing library size, but it is still possible that this analysis enables
insight vital to better IDS design.
The last figure, Figure 39, plots cross-map skill against time to prediction. Consider
for example airspeed xmap pitch. When tp is slightly less than zero, ρ is maximized;
this implies that airspeed best predicts pitch when lagged by about one second. In
other words, pitch strongly affects airspeed after one second. This is an expected
behavior. When tp is positive, ρ quickly decreases and thus we assert that airspeed
does not have a strong causal effect on pitch. This too is consistent with the standard
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Figure 38. Plots illustrating the causality between each pair of selected AVAS time
series.
interpretation of an airplane’s mechanics. Of course, further analysis of the figure
affords other conclusions. Note that the lines X xmap Y and Y xmap X are not
necessarily symmetrical because the process of using a shadow manifold M to forecast
another shadow manifold M is itself an asymmetrical process.
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Figure 39. Plots illustrating predictive capability by analyzing the causality between
each pair of selected AVAS time series.
4.3 Summary
This chapter discussed two sets of time series, one linear in nature and the other
nonlinear, and two different techniques for analyzing the time series. For each set, we
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first applied Granger causality to identify the causality between each pair of time series.
The results indicate some success when applying the technique to the linear system,
but they also indicate that Granger causality does not appear to apply to a nonlinear
system. We then applied EDM to the two systems to identify nonlinearity and chaos,
make next-point predictions, and quantify causality over time. This technique appears
to perform better for nonlinear systems, but it still enables some analysis for linear
systems. Section 5.2 examines the ramifications of these results.
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V. Conclusions
This chapter discusses the real-world implications of the findings presented in
Chapters III and IV. Section 5.1 summarizes the controller area network (CAN)
research, examines the implied risks to modern automobiles, and presents a potential
avenue for future work. Similarly, Section 5.2 describes implications of the findings
concerning the time series analysis techniques. Additionally, the section considers
limitations of the experiments and details several opportunities for future researchers.
Finally, Section 5.3 restates the research contributions and concludes this thesis.
5.1 Fingerprinting Vehicles with CAN Bus Data Samples
The research discussed in Chapter III has two primary conclusions:
1. A vehicle’s CAN data uniquely identifies its year, make, and model.
2. An attacker can use one of the tools presented to improve CAN attacks.
Clearly, one can fingerprint vehicles with CAN data samples. In three different
experiments, we evaluated classification performance using CAN samples consisting
of ordered payload data, of ordered arbitration IDs, and of unordered payload data.
For each experiment, the best classifier consists of a convolutional neural network
(CNN) trained on the full set of samples and meets or exceeds a balanced classification
accuracy of 98.83%. This performance indicates that deep learning methods can, with
high probability, fingerprint a vehicle using only its raw CAN data, at least for the
data used in this research.
Overall, our findings indicate a significant CAN vulnerability that an attacker
familiar with deep learning can easily exploit. Such an attacker can use a well-tuned
CNN (or a multilayer perceptron if resources or knowledge are limited) to build
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a database of known vehicles; the attacker can then reference this database when
intruding on a new CAN bus to better structure the desired attack. This risks operator
and passenger safety, and it warrants action on the part of automobile manufacturers.
It also warrants further research into other deep learning applications on the CAN.
As detailed in Section 3.5, devising a Siamese neural network (SNN) capable of
learning the difference between CAN segments from different vehicles is a logical
next step for this research. Although our exploratory efforts were unsuccessful, the
suggestions provided to future researchers may enable a stronger SNN. This would
be very helpful to the malicious intruder: such an attacker would not need to collect
CAN segments from every potential vehicle to effectively attack new vehicles.
5.2 EDM as a Component of an Intrusion Detection System
The Avionics Vulnerability Assessment System, while useful for this research, is
limited in scope. Future researchers who wish to affirm the conclusions found here
should generate data with an extensively tested simulator, or they should obtain real
data from real aircraft. In the same vein, the simulated linear system is elementary
and wanting for more real-world characteristics. Regardless, the results presented in
Section 4.2 suggest three primary findings:
1. For both linear and nonlinear systems, Granger causality’s limitations ensure
that intrusion detection system (IDS) architects should search elsewhere for
effective analysis techniques.
2. Although empirical dynamic modeling (EDM) can quantify behaviors present in
linear systems, the results are often limited and so are not likely to aid in the
development of IDSs.
3. For nonlinear systems, EDM is an easy-to-use suite of tools capable of evoking
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detailed insights that may assist in IDS design.
Although both (1) and (2) imply that the analysis techniques explored here are
unsuitable for linear systems, cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are often nonlinear.
It is important to note, however, that our limited linear system is likely not fully
representative of a real-world linear system. For this reason, future researchers may
wish to verify the applicability of the first two conclusions to a robust linear system.
Concerning (3), we assert that the analysis of a nonlinear system afforded by
EDM successfully enables the understanding required by the first step towards an IDS.
Section 4.2’s results demonstrate an ability to effectively quantify a nonlinear system’s
causality, and this in turn enables better system insight for IDS architects. However,
note that, although this research demonstrates the potential of EDM, we cannot
realize its true value without larger, more realistic, and more complex datasets and
without demonstrated success on a wider range of critical CPSs. Future work should
thus address these limitations as well as the remaining steps towards an IDS—namely,
obtaining quality data, identifying whether new traffic conforms to the patterns
exhibited by the data, and creating a system to notify the administrator when the
traffic does not. Future researchers may also wish to conduct a deep exploration of
other time series forecasting and analysis techniques, like autoregressive integrated
moving average, for IDS design. Still, we believe EDM to be a powerful, emerging tool
relevant to critical infrastructure protection, and we strongly suggest further research
into its applications to IDSs and beyond.
5.3 Contributions & Conclusion
This work first explored a risk to a specific, common CPS before considering
methods to protect any given CPS from intruders. In doing so, our research has made
several contributions to CAN security, to IDS development, and to cybersecurity as a
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whole. In Chapter III, we showed empirically that a vehicle’s raw CAN traffic can
uniquely identify the vehicle, and we theorized ways in which an attacker could exploit
this vulnerability. This is the first known demonstration of this CAN vulnerability
and of its associated risks. In Chapter IV, we examined two techniques for time series
analysis to determine whether either technique can enable a viable IDS for vulnerable
systems like the CAN. The discussion of EDM’s applicability to IDS development
may serve as the motivation for additional research efforts. The provided library of all
available EDM functions could enable other studies concerning nonlinear time series
analysis in a wide range of fields. Finally, it is our belief that more research into (1)
mitigating the demonstrated CAN vulnerability and (2) further applying EDM to IDS
development will prove beneficial to the field of cybersecurity and, specifically, to the
protection of CPSs.
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Appendix A. Equation Derivations for the Linear System
This appendix derives the equations used to compute the inside and outside wheel
RPMs. Table 19 defines the variables used in these equations.
Table 19. Variable Definitions
for the RPM Equation Derivations
Variable Meaning
rw wheel radius
b wheelbase
k track
t steering ratio
s forward speed
θ current steering wheel angle
φ inside wheel angle
ri inside turning radius
ro outside turning radius
r average turning radius
RPMd straight-line wheel RPM
RPMi inside wheel RPM
RPMo outside wheel RPM
The inside wheel’s turning angle is defined by
φ =
θ
t
. (1)
Using (1), the turning radius of the inside wheel is
ri =
b
cos (90− φ) . (2)
We compute the outside wheel’s turning radius with the Pythagorean theorem:
ro =
√
b2 + (k + b tan (90− φ))2. (3)
The radius of the center of the car about the pivot is the average of (2) and (3):
r =
ri + ro
2
. (4)
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When the car travels in a straight line, both wheels rotate at
RPMd =
30s
pirw
. (5)
We can multiply (5) by the ratio of (2) to (4) to obtain
RPMi =
ri
r
(RPMd) . (6)
Similarly, for (5), (3), and (4),
RPMo =
ro
r
(RPMd) . (7)
In defining (6) and (7) exclusively in terms of non-derived variables, we find that
RPMi =
60sb
pirw
(
b+ cos
(
90− θ
t
)√
b2 +
(
k + b tan
(
90− θ
t
))2) (8)
and
RPMo =
60s
√
b2 +
(
k + b tan
(
90− θ
t
))2
pirw
(
b sec
(
90− θ
t
)
+
√
b2 +
(
k + b tan
(
90− θ
t
))2) . (9)
We presented (8) and (9) in Section 4.1.1.
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Appendix B. EDM Analysis in R
The following R code serves as a demonstration of the rEDM implementation we
used for the linear dataset. We stripped all irrelevant details, including plot formatting
and exporting, for brevity and clarity. As presented, the functions require an input
file with a specific format. Table 20 depicts this format.
Table 20. Input File Format for rEDM Functions
Time Steering wheel angle Left wheel RPM Right wheel RPM
0 0.000000000 0.500000000 0.500000000
1 0.037775020 0.531704461 0.468295539
2 0.075493318 0.562495611 0.437504389
3 0.113098283 0.592274058 0.407725942
. . . . . . . . . . . .
As mentioned in Section 4.1.3, we use the Sugihara Laboratory’s rEDM repository
on GitHub for the core EDM functionality. That section describes this functionality.
Our code, meanwhile, collates the various rEDM tutorials hosted by the Sugihara
Laboratory into a single, easy-to-follow library. We include the following functions:
• ComputeE: This function computes the optimal embedding dimension E for some
input time series.
• ComputeTp: This function computes the optimal time to prediction tp for some
input time series to analyze deterministic chaos.
• PlotNonlinearity: This function computes the nonlinearity present in some
input time series.
• PlotPredictions: This function makes and plots next-point predictions for
some input time series.
• PlotCausality: This function computes pairwise causality against library size
for each pair of time series in an input set.
75
• PlotCausalityMeans: This function computes pairwise causality over time for
each pair of time series in an input set.
• RunEdm: This function applies all other functions to an input set of time series.
Of course, researchers interested in our efforts may wish to modify this code to suit
their own purposes. In this case, we recommend consulting the rEDM repository20
and the Sugihara Laboratory’s profile,21 both on GitHub. The latter also includes
repositories for EDM functions in Python and in C++.
20https://github.com/SugiharaLab/rEDM
21https://github.com/SugiharaLab
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# -----------------------------------------------------------
# Initialization Details
# -----------------------------------------------------------
# load required libraries
library(rEDM)
library(plyr)
library(ggplot2)
# load dataset
df <- read.csv("data/steering.csv")
# segment dataset into library/prediction sets
n <- NROW(df)
lib <- c(1, floor(2/3 * n))
pred <- c(floor(2/3 * n) + 1, n)
# segregate and scale each time series
steering <- df[c("Time", "Steering.wheel.angle")]
left <- df[c("Time", "Left.wheel.RPM")]
right <- df[c("Time", "Right.wheel.RPM")]
steering$Steering.wheel.angle <- scale(steering$Steering.wheel.angle)
left$Left.wheel.RPM <- scale(left$Left.wheel.RPM)
right$Right.wheel.RPM <- scale(right$Right.wheel.RPM)
# -----------------------------------------------------------
# Key EDM Functionality
# -----------------------------------------------------------
# identify the optimal embedding dimension (E)
ComputeE <- function(var) {
out <- simplex(var , lib=lib , pred=pred , E=1:10)
out[is.na(out)] <- 0
out$rho[out$rho < 0] <- 0
E <- which.max(as.numeric(unlist(out[c("rho")])))
E <- as.numeric(unlist(out[c("E")]))[E]
plot(out$E, out$rho , type="l", main=colnames(var)[-1], xlab="E", ylab="ρ")
return(E)
}
# identify the optimal time to prediction (tp)
ComputeTp <- function(var , sequence =0:10) {
opt_e <- ComputeE(var)
out <- simplex(var , lib=lib , pred=pred , E=opt_e, tp=sequence)
tp <- which.max(as.numeric(unlist(out[c("rho")])))
tp <- as.numeric(unlist(out[c("tp")]))[tp]
plot(out$tp, out$rho , type="l", main=colnames(var)[-1], xlab="tp", ylab="ρ")
return(tp)
}
# identify any nonlinearity present in the system
PlotNonlinearity <- function(var) {
opt_e <- ComputeE(var)
out <- s_map(var , lib , pred , E=opt_e)
plot(out$theta , out$rho , type="l", main=colnames(var)[-1], xlab="θ", ylab="ρ")
}
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# make and plot next -point predictions
PlotPredictions <- function(var , sequence =0:10) {
opt_e <- ComputeE(var)
opt_tp <- ComputeTp(var , sequence)
out <- simplex(var , lib=lib , pred=pred , E=opt_e, tp=sequence , stats_only=FALSE)
preds <- na.omit(out$model_output [[opt_tp + 1]])
plot(var , type="l", main=colnames(var)[-1], xlab="Time", ylab="Value")
lines(preds$time , preds$pred , col="blue", lty=2)
polygon(c(preds$time , rev(preds$time)), c(preds$pred - sqrt(preds$pred_var),
rev(preds$pred + sqrt(preds$pred_var))), col=rgb(0,0,1,0.3), border=NA)
}
# conduct and plot pairwise causality analyses over time
PlotCausality <- function(vars=list(steering , left , right), tp= -10:10) {
# identify the optimal embedding dimension (E) for each column
i <- 1
opt_e <- list()
var_names <- list()
for (var in vars) {
var_names[i] <- colnames(var)[-1]
opt_e[i] <- ComputeE(var)
i <- i + 1
}
opt_e <- unlist(opt_e)
var_names <- unlist(var_names)
# get every combination of var1 xmap var2
# add an (E) column that corresponds to the lib column
params <- expand.grid(lib_column=var_names , target_column=var_names ,
tp=tp , stringsAsFactors=FALSE)
params <- params[params$lib_column != params$target_column ,]
rownames(params) <- NULL
params$E <- as.integer(mapvalues(params$lib_column , var_names ,
opt_e, warn_missing=FALSE))
# compute causality
out <- do.call(rbind , lapply(seq_len(NROW(params)), function(i) {
ccm(df , E=params$E[i], random_libs=FALSE , lib_sizes=n,
lib_column=params$lib_column[i],
target_column=params$target_column[i],
tp=params$tp[i], silent=TRUE)
}))
# add a new column to label each pair
out$direction <- paste(out$lib_column , "xmap", out$target_column)
# plot the causalities
labels <- paste(as.character(round (0.1 * tp , 2)), "(s)")
ggplot(out , aes(tp , rho , colour=direction)) + geom_line() + geom_point() +
geom_vline(xintercept =0, linetype="dashed") + labs(x="tp", y="ρ") +
scale_x_discrete(limits=tp, labels=labels)
}
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# conduct and plot pairwise causality analyses
PlotCausalityMeans <- function(var1 , var2) {
# compute causality means
label1 <- colnames(var1)[-1]
label2 <- colnames(var2)[-1]
opt_e <- ComputeE(df[c("Time", label1 , label2)])
var1_xmap_var2_means <- ccm_means(ccm(df , E=opt_e, num_samples =100,
lib_column=label1 , target_column=label2 , lib_sizes=seq(50, 950, by=50),
random_libs=TRUE , replace=TRUE))
var2_xmap_var1_means <- ccm_means(ccm(df , E=opt_e, num_samples =100,
lib_column=label2 , target_column=label1 , lib_sizes=seq(50, 950, by=50),
random_libs=TRUE , replace=TRUE))
# compute parallel maxima
y1 <- pmax(0, var1_xmap_var2_means$rho)
y2 <- pmax(0, var2_xmap_var1_means$rho)
# plot the causality means
title <- paste(label1 , "&", label2)
limits <- c(min(min(y1), min(y2)), max(max(y1 , max(y2))))
plot(var1_xmap_var2_means$lib_size , y1 , type="l", ylim=limits ,
main=title , xlab="Library Size", ylab="ρ", col="red",)
lines(var2_xmap_var1_means$lib_size , y2, col="blue")
legend(x="topleft", col=c("red", "blue"), lwd=1, bty="n", inset =0.02, cex=0.8,
legend=c(paste(label1 , "xmap", label2), paste(label2 , "xmap", label1)))
}
# -----------------------------------------------------------
# Primary Function to Orchestrate Ensemble of EDM Functions
# -----------------------------------------------------------
# calls all other functions
RunEdm <- function(vars=list(steering , left , right)){
for (var in vars) {
PlotNonlinearity(var)
PlotPredictions(var)
}
for (var1 in vars) {
for (var2 in vars) {
if (colnames(var1)[-1] != colnames(var2)[-1]) {
PlotCausalityMeans(var1 , var2)
}
}
}
PlotCausality(vars)
}
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